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Sammanfattning 
 
Examensarbetets titel: The relationship between CDS spreads and bond spreads – an 
empirical comparison 
 
Seminariedatum: 2008-01-15. 
 
Ämne/kurs: Företagsekonomi, finansiering, 15 p, Examensarbete på magisternivå.  
 
Författare: Carl-Johan Berggren & Nina Mattsson 
 
Handledare: Göran Anderson 
 
Fem nyckelord: credit default swap, prissättning av kreditrisk, bond spread, arbitrage, 
kointegration 
 
Syfte: Syftet är att undersöka sambandet mellan CDS-spreaden och bond-spreaden, samt att 
jämföra dessa över tid. Detta genomförs genom att testa för ett kointegrationssamband samt 
Granger-kausalitet mellan CDS-spreaden och bond-spreaden för varje enhet som ingår i 
urvalet, och för olika perioder. Också deskriptiv statistik används. 
 
Metod: Kvantitativ metod: Augmented Dickey-Fuller test, KPSS, Engle-Granger test, 
Johansen-test, Granger-kausalitet 
 
Teoretiska perspektiv: Prissättningsmodeller för kreditrisk. Arbitragesamband. 
 
Empiri: Bond-spread och CDS-spread för 29 st företag (klassificerade som financials) från S&P 
350 och S&P 500. Tidsperiod: 2004-01-01 till 2008-11-24. 
 
Slutsatser: Undersökningen visar på att de undersökta företagens CDS- respektive bond-
spread uppvisar varierande grad av kointegration under de olika tidsperioderna som 
undersökts. Därmed är det svårt dra några egentliga slutsatser av de tvetydiga resultaten. 
Däremot står det att finna i materialet att både den genomsnittliga CDS-spreaden, 
genomsnittliga bond-spreaden och den genomsnittliga skillnaden dem emellan ökar markant 
under undersökningens sista 17 månader, vilka är präglade av finansiell oro. 
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Summary in English 
 
Title: The relationship between CDS spreads and bond spreads – an empirical comparison 
 
Seminar date: 2008-01-15. 
 
Course: Master thesis in business administration (finance), 15 University Credit Points (15 
ECTS).  
 
Authors: Carl-Johan Berggren & Nina Mattsson 
 
Advisor/s: Göran Anderson 
 
Five key words: credit default swap, credit risk pricing, bond spread, arbitrage, cointegration 
 
Purpose: The purpose of the thesis is to investigate the relationship between the CDS spreads 
and bond spreads, and to compare this relationship over time. This will be performed through 
testing for a cointegration relationship and Granger causality between the CDS spread and 
bond spreads of the entities studied, for different time periods, combined with the aid of 
descriptive statistics. Also the change in CDS spread and bond spread over time will be 
studied. 
 
Methodology: Quantitative method: Augmented Dickey-Fuller test, KPSS, Engle-Granger test, 
Johansen-test, Granger causality 
 
Theoretical perspectives:  Pricing models for credit risk. Arbitrage relationship. 
 
Empirical foundation: The relationship between the bond spread and CDS spread for 29 
corporates (classified as financials) from S&P 350 och S&P 500 are investigated. Time period: 
2004-01-01 to 2008-11-24. 
 
Conclusions: The tests shows that the CDS spread and the bond spread of the entities 
investigated exhibit various degrees of cointegration, during the different periods investigated. 
It is difficult to draw any specific conclusions from the ambivalent results. However, the 
material shows a higher average CDS spread, average bond spread, and average credit spread 
in the last app. 16 months of the period investigated, which are characterised by financial 
turmoil 
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Glossary 
 
Bond spread – the yield to maturity of a certain bond, minus the risk free rate (in this 
investigation the swap rate is used as a proxy for risk free rate). 
 
CDS – Credit Default Swap. The most common type of credit derivate. Functions as an 
insurance to avoid the default risk of a bond issuer. Can be used for both hedging and 
speculation. 
 
CDS spread – The price of the CDS, expressed in basis points of the contract’s notional value. 
 
CDS premium – see CDS spread. 
 
CDS price – see CDS spread. 
 
Credit event – the event that triggers the payment from the seller to the buyer of a CDS 
contract, for example default. 
 
Credit spread – the difference between the CDS spread and the Bond spread. 
 
Notional amount – the face value of the bond connected to a CDS contract. It can also relate to 
the amount covered by the CDS contract, in case it differs from the bond’s notional value. 
 
Reference entity – the issuer of the underlying bond in a CDS contract.  
 
S&P 350 – Standard & Poor’s index which contains 350 leading companies in Europe, spanning 
17 exchanges. It is also a component of S&P Global 1200. 
 
S&P 500 – Standard & Poor’s index which contains 500 leading companies in leading industries 
of the U.S. economy. It is also a component of S&P Global 1200. 
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Introduction and Background 
The background contains a description of the history and characteristics of Credit Default Swaps 
(CDSs). Thereafter some of the organisations influencing the documentation and 
clearing/settlement process will be presented. The background also provides a depiction of the 
development of the current credit crisis. The experienced reader may skip to the section of the 
problem discussion.  
Credit Default Swaps 
Credit Default Swaps were invented in the mid/late nineties and are derivative instruments 
based on underlying fixed income securities such as corporate or government bonds.1 A CDS 
could be said to provide “insurance” against a credit event destroying value in an entity’s (a 
corporation’s or a financial institution’s) debt, e.g. a bond. The buyer of the CDS pays a 
premium (usually quarterly or semi annually) over a fixed time period to the seller. These 
periodic payments are usually expressed as a percentage (in basis points) of the bond's 
notional value, and are called the CDS spread (or the CDS premium).2 The payments are done 
either until the CDS contract matures, or a credit event occurs, i.e. the bond issuer can’t fulfil 
its obligations (within the life of the contract). The credit events are defined in the 
documentation; see the section about ISDA for further examples. If such an event occurs, the 
seller of the CDS provides compensation to the buyer, who will suffer no loss.3 Credit Default 
Swaps are privately negotiated contracts traded on over-the-counter markets, hence there is no 
exchange for CDSs.4 
 
In the figure below, the cash flows for the buyer and seller of a CDS are shown (they are 
naturally inverted). As can be seen, the cash flows are comparable to the cash flows of the two 
parties in a normal insurance agreement.  
 
                                                     
1 Berndt Antje; Jarrow, Robert A.; Kang, ChoongOh, ”Restructuring risk in credit default swaps: An empirical analysis”, Stochastic 
Processes and their Applications, 2007:11, p. 1724-1749. It should be noted that there are some different conceptions of the 
exact year for invention, but all sources state years between 1995 and 1997. 
2 Zhu, Haibin ”An Empirical Comparison of Credit Spreads between the Bond Market and the Credit Default Swap Market”, 
Journal of Financial Services Research, 2006:3, p. 211-235 
3 Berndt et al ”Restructuring risk in credit default swaps: An empirical analysis”, Stochastic Processes and their Applications, 
2007:11, p. 1724-1749. 
4 “A Reuters guide to Credit Default Swaps”, available at http://about.reuters.com/productinfo/s/credit_default_swaps/  
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Figure 1: Cash flows that arise from a CDS contract 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The CDS could be seen as an insurance product, but with the difference that the buyer of 
protection is not obliged to hold the underlying asset (in this case normally a bond). The CDS 
makes it possible to separate the risk is from the underlying debt and transfer the credit risk 
from one party to another.5 Hence, credit default swaps could be used both for hedging, as well 
as speculation.  
 
The trade in the instrument has grown rapidly, almost exponentially. As an example, the 
notional amount outstanding of credit default swaps was $57.9 trillion in Q2 2008, compared 
to only $4.6 trillion end 2004.6 
                                                     
5 Chan –Lau, Jorge A. “Anticipating Credit Events Using Credit Default Swaps, with an Application to Sovereign Debt Crises”, IMF 
Working Paper, May 2003 (WP/03/106) 
6 “Regular OTC Derivatives Market Statistics”, statistics from Bank of International Settlements (BIS), available at 
http://www.bis.org/publ/otc_hy0811.htm  
t 
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event of the underlying 
object occurs. 
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periodic payments to 
the seller, until the 
maturity date of the 
CDS or if a credit 
event occurs. 
Buyer of a 
CDS 
 
The seller receives 
periodic payments 
from the buyer, until 
the maturity date of 
the CDS or if a credit 
event occurs. 
Seller of a 
CDS 
t 
Underlying 
reference 
entity  
This outflow realises if a 
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 8 
 
If a credit event occurs, the contract could be settled either through physical settlement or cash 
settlement. If physical settlement is agreed upon, the buyer delivers the reference security, or 
an equivalent, to the seller and receives in return the notional value. If cash settlement is used, 
the buyer receives the difference between the par value of the reference instrument and the 
market value at the time of the default event occurring.7 
 
The term “swap” derives from the view that the CDS could be seen as “a swap of a default-free 
floating-rate note for a defaultable floating-rate note”.8 
 
The market prices of the CDSs (CDS spread) should reflect market assessments of the 
likelihood of the credit event and the expected value of the reference security after the credit 
event.9 The CDS spread thereby provides an alternative market price of credit risk.10 In this 
sense, the instrument works as a key indicator of the credit quality of corporates, banks and 
sovereigns.11 
 
As most terms and conditions of a CDS contract, also the maturity is negotiable, and the 
maturity for the CDS is not necessarily the same as for the reference entity. There are 
maturities from a few months up to 10 years, but most CDSs are quoted for a benchmark time-
to-maturity of 5 years.12 
 
CDSs are OTC-products (over-the-counter), hence there are no traditional regulated exchange 
markets for CDSs. However, the major part of all CDSs are cleared and settled through the 
organisation DTCC, please see description below.  
 
Most contracts are based on ISDA documentation, see below.  
ISDA 
ISDA, the International Swaps and Derivatives Association, is the largest global financial trade 
association (by number of member firms), and represents participants in the privately 
negotiated derivatives industry. ISDA has developed documentation and international 
contractual standards governing privately negotiated derivatives transactions, and most of the 
largest market participants use ISDA’s documentation e.g. “ISDA Master Agreement” as a legal 
base for trading of derivatives. According to this agreement there are six “credit events”.13 
 
Credit events according to ISDA:  
Bankruptcy. The definition of bankruptcy includes insolvency events such as winding up, 
administration and receivership. 
                                                     
7 “CDS – Physical Vs Cash Settlement”, Derivatives Week, January 16, 2006 
8 Duffie, D, “Credit Swap Valuation” Financial Analysts Journal, 1999:1, p. 73-87. 
9 Chan –Lau, Jorge A. “Anticipating Credit Events Using Credit Default Swaps, with an Application to Sovereign Debt Crises”, IMF 
Working Paper, May 2003 (WP/03/106) 
10 Zhu, Haibin ”An Empirical Comparison of Credit Spreads between the Bond Market and the Credit Default Swap Market”, 
Journal of Financial Services Research, 2006:3, p. 211-235 
11 Dötz, Niko, “Time-varying contributions by the corporate bond and CDS markets to credit risk price discovery”, Discussion 
Paper: series 2: Banking and Financial Studies, no 08/2007, published by Deutsche Bundesbank. 
12 Daniels, Kenneth N.; Jensen, Malene Shin, “The Effect of Credit Ratings on Credit Default Swap Spreads and Credit Spreads”, 
The Journal of Fixed Income, 2005:12,  vol. 15, p. 16-35. 
13 2002 ISDA Master Agreement.   
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Failure to pay. This event covers the reference entity failing to make a payment of principal or 
interest. A minimum threshold amount is normally nominated in the confirmation that must 
be exceeded before this event is triggered. 
 
Obligation acceleration. This event covers a reference entity’s debt obligation being accelerated 
by reason of an event of default. A minimum threshold amount is normally nominated in the 
confirmation that must be exceeded before this event is triggered. 
 
Obligation default. This event covers the reference entity defaulting on one of its debts 
obligations. 
 
Repudiation/moratorium. This event covers the reference entity repudiating all or some of its 
debts or declaring a moratorium over all or some of its debts. 
 
Restructuring. This event covers the reference entity arranging for some or all of its debts to be 
restructured causing a material adverse change in their creditworthiness. 
 
These events are “triggers” for the CDSs, as described above, in the sense that when one of 
these occurs, the seller’s obligation to compensate the buyer is realized. However, since CDSs 
are not publicly traded, there are no obligations to publicly present information about when a 
credit event has occurred.   
DTCC 
The Depository Trust & Clearing Corporation (DTCC) provides clearing and settlements of a 
wide range of financial products, including CDSs. In November 2006 an electronic central 
registry for credit default was established by DTCC, where the vast majority of credit default 
swaps traded is registered. To meet market concerns of transparency, DTCC has recently 
decided to publish the outstanding gross and net notional values of CDSs, with effect from 
2008-11-04.14 This will hopefully improve information availability for future research.  
 
Credit Crisis (of 2007–2008) 
The current credit crisis is also referred to as the “credit crunch” and its full effect is probably 
not yet seen. Naturally, from a scientific perspective it is difficult to define an exact start date 
of the crisis. Still, 9 August 2007 is often referred to as a pivotal date15, since it is the day that 
the European Central Bank injected 95 billion Euros into the European market, and the Federal 
Reserve injected 24 billion USD in the American market.16 But let us start from the beginning. 
(The description below is based on Kashyap et al17, and Milne18, which are both in line with the 
general view of the course of events.)  
                                                     
14 “DTCC to Provide CDS Data from Trade Information Warehouse”, Press release from DTCC, 31 Oct, 2008. 
15 See for example: ”Timeline: Global Credit Crunch”, BBC News, updated November 14, 2008 , “Credit crisis - how it all began”, 
Guardian.co.uk, August 15, 2008, or Tett, Gillian,“The big freeze: A year that shook faith in finance”, Financial Times, August 3, 
2008  
16 “Kadoya, Tamawa Fed's $24 bln money shot pales against ECB move”,  Reuters August 9, 2007 
17 Kashyap, Anil; Rajan, Raghuram Stein Jeremy, “The Global Roots of the Current Financial Crisis and its Implications for 
Regulation” Conference Paper published by ECB. 
18 Milne, Frank, ”Anatomy of the Credit Crisis: The Role of Faulty Risk Management Systems” Howe Institute Commentary, No. 
269, July 2008, available at www.cdhowe.org/pdf/commentary_269.pdf 
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The current credit crisis is, by Kashyap, Milne and many others, argued to have started in the 
US mortgage market.19 Due to among other things low price on risk, and inadequate credit risk 
assessment, housing loans were approved also to people without proper repayment capacity 
(so called subprime loans). The mortgage loans were then bundled into CDOs (collateral debt 
obligations), ABSs (Asset backed securities) and other instruments, which were often divided 
in tranches with different seniority and sold further on the international loan market. Due to 
the complexity and low transparency of these products, the parties involved did not judge the 
risks properly. The rating agencies' risk assessment of these produces has also been criticised. 
One problem is that the rating agencies are paid by the actual entity that is rated, which 
probably results in a potential principal/agent problem. Another related problem was that 
institutions did not investigate the details of the underlying collateral, since they assessed the 
credit rating as guarantee enough. 
 
However, when the US property and home market began to decline, and the loans started to 
default, the problems started. It also turned out that default risk on the complex instruments 
was higher than expected, since they had far less diversification of the assets than originally 
thought. When investors became aware of this, it resulted in two things: first, the mortgage 
backed securities decreased in value, and secondly, almost nobody was willing to lend against 
them as security. Thereby it became difficult for the banks to raise liquidity and funding 
problems emerged. Furthermore, it was difficult to know exactly how exposed each bank was. 
 
All this became clear to the market in the late summer/early autumn of 2007 and resulted in 
an extremely low inter-bank confidence, an almost “frozen” inter-bank market, and 
exceptionally high inter-bank interest rates. To mitigate this, many national banks went in 
with capital injections and guarantees.  
 
One of the first victims of the crisis was Northern Rock that received capital injections from 
Bank of England in September 2007,20 and was nationalized in February 2008.21 Also Bear 
Stearns experienced financial problems and was acquired by JP Morgan in May 2008.22 
 
After the summer of 2008, the crisis that had started in 2007 as a “subprime crisis” and 
developed into a “liquidity crisis” or “credit crunch”, had spread to become a whole scale 
“financial crisis”. The US mortgage lenders Fannie May and Freddie Mac were put under 
governmental control in September 2008.23 The same month the investment bank Lehman 
Brothers announced its bankruptcy.24 In October 2008, further a number of banks and 
financial institutions had financial problems and were nationalized (sometimes partly), 
restructured, or overtaken.  
 
                                                     
19 Kashyap, Anil; Rajan, Raghuram Stein Jeremy, “The Global Roots of the Current Financial Crisis and its Implications for 
Regulation” Conference Paper published by ECB. Milne, Frank, ”Anatomy of the Credit Crisis: The Role of Faulty Risk 
Management Systems” Howe Institute Commentary, No. 269, July 2008, available at 
www.cdhowe.org/pdf/commentary_269.pdf 
20 “Liquidity Support Facility for Northern Rock plc”, news release from Bank of England, September 14, 2007. 
21 “Northern Rock to be Nationalised”, BBC News, February 17, 2008 
22 “Bear Stearns passes into Wall Street history”, Financial Times, May 29, 2008 
23 “America’s government takes control of Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae”, The Economist, September 8, 2008. 
24 “Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc announces it intends to file chapter 11 bankruptcy petition”, Press release from Lehman 
Brothers, September 15, 2008. 
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From now on, we refer to the current credit crisis as the period from August 2007 until 
present.25 When referring to statistical data, our investigation contains figures until 2008-11-24.  
 
It has been argued that the large amount of outstanding CDSs had exacerbated the current 
crisis.26 For example, the discussion goes, if it were not so easy to mitigate the risk of the earlier 
mentioned sub-prime mortgages by CDSs, investors might have been forced to have better risk 
management systems, and been more cautious to take on risk.27 It has also been argued that 
the descent of AIG, (previously the world’s largest insurance company) was triggered by losses 
on its CDS contracts.28 
 
It is still unclear how the financial situation will progress. Some debaters fear that the CDSs 
might cause huge problems, caused by the combination of large amount of outstanding CDS 
contracts that indirectly link a wide number of companies together, together with the low 
transparency and the fact that it is not public information how large, and which type, of 
exposure each entity has.29 Due to this, voices have been raised that demand a more regulated 
market, providing for more transparency.30 
 
It remains to be seen how the CDS market will continue to develop, and which implications it 
will have.  
 
Theoretical perspectives 
In this section, a background of the theoretical perspectives and the foundation for the arbitrage 
relationship between bonds and CDSs are presented.  
Pricing models for credit risk 
There are two main groups of academic credit risk pricing models: structural models and 
reduced form models.31 The structural models were pioneered by Merton in the 70’s32, and are 
                                                     
25 The crisis is of course not over yet, but for practical purposes the investigation does not cover information or events that derive 
from any point after 24 November 2008. (This is in order to avoid updating the figures during the ongoing process of analyzing 
and writing.) 
26 See for example Laing, Jonathan, “Weapons of Mass Speculation” Barron's; May 12, 2008 available at 
http://online.barrons.com/article/SB121037952364682261.html 
27 Dickinson, Eric ”Credit Default Swaps: So Dear To Us, So Dangerous”, Working paper from Fordham Law School, 20 November 
2008. Available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1315535 
28 See for example Dickinson, Eric ”Credit Default Swaps: So Dear To Us, So Dangerous”, Working paper from Fordham Law 
School, 20 November 2008. Available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1315535 or Varchaver, Nicholas 
and Benner, Katie, “The 55 trillion question” Fortune, Special report, available at 
http://money.cnn.com/2008/09/30/magazines/fortune/varchaver_derivatives_short.fortune/index.htm 
29 See for example Varchaver, Nicholas and Benner, Katie, “The 55 trillion question” Fortune, Special report, available at 
http://money.cnn.com/2008/09/30/magazines/fortune/varchaver_derivatives_short.fortune/index.htm 
30 See for example Linnane, Ciara et al. ”Federal Reserve Pushes for Central CDS 
Counterparty”, Reuters, Oct. 6, 2008, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/marketsNews/idUSN0655208920081006 
31 Zhu, Haibin, ”An Empirical Comparison of Credit Spreads between the Bond Market and the Credit Default Swap Market”, 
Journal of Financial Services Research, 2006:3, p. 211-235. 
32 One key article is Merton, Robert C, ”On the pricing of corporate debt: the risk structure of interest rates”, The Journal of 
Finance, vol. 29, no 2, May 1974. 
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based on the value of the firm, and that default occurs when the value hits a given boundary.33 
This view is based on microeconomic theories, and comprises parameters such as firm value 
dynamics and leverage ratio.  
 
In the reduced form models, by contrast, represented by among other Duffie & Singleton, 
default is treated in a more “statistical” way, in that it is seen as an “unpredictable event”.34 
Credit spread is determined by risk neutral valuation under the absence of arbitrage 
opportunities. This view provides a framework to connect bond spreads with CDS spreads.35 
This thesis will not go further into detail of different pricing models of credit risk, but instead 
make use of the approximate arbitrage relation that exists between CDS spreads and bond 
spreads for a given reference entity.  
 
Pricing models for Credit Default Swaps 
One of the most wide-spread pricing models for CDSs is defined by Duffie.36 This is used as 
foundation for the research by among others Zhu, Hull et al, Houweling & Worst, Dötz etc.37 
 
The model suggests the following: 
 
Let s be the premium that the protection buyer (the buyer of a CDS) pays, until the CDS 
contract matures, or the pre-defined credit event occurs. Set the yield to maturity of a 
corporate bond (with default) risk to y. Risk free interest rate is r. If combined, a risky bond 
and the protection of a CDS, could be said to create a synthetic risk free bond. The cash flow of 
this portfolio should be equal or close to the cash flow of a risk free bond. This indicates that 
the following relationship should hold approximately: 
 
s = y – r 
 
Hence, the CDS premium should be equal to the spread of the par fixed coupon bond.38 If this 
relation does not hold, arbitrage possibilities arise. For example, if y – r is larger than s, it 
would be profitable to sell the risk free bond short, and buy a corporate bond for the proceeds, 
and mitigate the bond’s default risk through buying a CDS.  If the opposite is true and s is 
                                                     
33 Blanco et al. “An Empirical Analysis of the Dynamic Relation between Investment-Grade Bonds and Credit Default Swaps”, The 
Journal of Finance, Vol LX, no. 5, 2005 
34 Duffie, Darrel; Singleton, Kenneth J., “Modeling Term Structures of Defaultable Bonds”, The Review of Financial Studies, Vol. 12, 
No. 4 (1999), pp. 687-720 
35 Zhu, Haibin, ”An Empirical Comparison of Credit Spreads between the Bond Market and the Credit Default Swap Market”, 
Journal of Financial Services Research, 2006:3, p. 211-235. 
36 Duffie, D, “Credit Swap Valuation” Financial Analysts Journal, 1999:1, p. 73-87.  
37 Zhu, Haibin, ”An Empirical Comparison of Credit Spreads between the Bond Market and the Credit Default Swap Market”, 
Journal of Financial Services Research, 2006:3, p. 211-235, . Hull, John; Predescu, Mirela; White Alan, “The relationship between 
credit default swap spreads, bond yields and credit rating announcements”, Journal of Banking and Finance, 2004:28, p. 2789-
2811, Houweling, Patrick; Vorst, Ton, “An Empirical Comparison of Default Swap Pricing Models”, Working Paper, Erasmus 
University Rotterdam, 2002:6., Dötz, Niko, “Time-varying contributions by the corporate bond and CDS markets to credit risk 
price discovery”, Discussion Paper: series 2: Banking and Financial Studies, no 08/2007, published by Deutsche Bundesbank 
38 Zhu, Haibin, ”An Empirical Comparison of Credit Spreads between the Bond Market and the Credit Default Swap Market”, 
Journal of Financial Services Research, 2006:3, p. 211-235. 
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larger than y – r, an arbitrageur could sell CDS protection, and thereby receive the CDS 
premium, sell the corporate bond short, and invest the proceeds in a risk free bond.39 
 
However, for various reasons, this relationship does not always hold exactly. Like in most 
economic theories, there are a number of assumptions inherent in this reasoning. For example, 
factors as counterparty risk, tax effects and transaction costs are not taken into consideration. 
The theorem also presupposes that market players, willing to sell protection, are available, as 
well as providers of risk-free bonds. Furthermore, it also ignores contingent differences of the 
contracts, for example as regards the definition of credit event. Still, this reasoning is widely 
used as foundation for a number of similar investigations, for example Zhu, Dötz, Hull et al, 
Daniels & Jensen, to mention some of them.40 
 
The bond spread is defined as y – r. One important question when determining the bond 
spread is the following: which interest rate should then be used as an estimate of the risk free 
interest rate? There are two alternatives often suggested: swap rate and treasury rate. The swap 
rate contains some risk, since it is based on the interbank rate (LIBOR), and is thereby 
normally somewhat higher than the treasury rate.41 However, Houweling & Vorst find that a 
use of the treasury rate results in a “significant overestimation” of the credit risk for investment 
grade issuers. For speculative grade issuers the difference is smaller. Research by both Hull et 
al and Houweling & Vorst concludes that the former gives the best proxy.42,43 This also seems 
to be the preferred choice in most cases of similar research. Therefore also this investigation 
uses the swap rate as a proxy for risk free interest rate.  
 
There is also another risk type built in into the CDS contract, namely the counterparty risk (the 
risk between the protection buyer and protection seller). Hull & White has elaborated a 
method to value the influence of counterparty risk of a CDS spread.44 However, they conclude 
that in most cases, the impact of counterparty risk is very small. One explanation to this is that 
if the counterparty defaults, the purchaser of a CDS can enter into a new contract with a new 
counterparty to regain the protection for the rest of the life of the original contract. Most 
similar investigations known to us chose to ignore counterparty risk, and based on this and the 
small impact of it on the CDS spread, hence, we will not further deal with counterparty risk in 
this thesis. 
 
 
                                                     
39 Dötz. Niko,“Time-varying contributions by the corporate bond and CDS markets to credit risk price discovery”, Discussion 
Paper: series 2: Banking and Financial Studies, no 08/2007, published by Deutsche Bundesbank 
40 Zhu, Haibin, ”An Empirical Comparison of Credit Spreads between the Bond Market and the Credit Default Swap Market”, 
Journal of Financial Services Research, 2006:3, p. 211-235, Hull, John; Predescu, Mirela; White Alan, “The relationship between 
credit default swap spreads, bond yields and credit rating announcements”, Journal of Banking and Finance, 2004:28, p. 2789-
2811, Daniels, Kenneth N.; Jensen, Malene Shin, “The Effect of Credit Ratings on Credit Default Swap Spreads and Credit 
Spreads”, The Journal of Fixed Income, 2005:12,  vol. 15, p. 16-35. 
41 Blanco et al. “An Empirical Analysis of the Dynamic Relation between Investment-Grade Bonds and Credit Default Swaps”, The 
Journal of Finance, Vol LX, no. 5, 2005, p. 2261 
42 Hull, John; Predescu, Mirela; White Alan, “The relationship between credit default swap spreads, bond yields and credit rating 
announcements”, Journal of Banking and Finance, 2004:28, p. 2789-2811. 
43 Houweling, Patrick; Vorst, Ton, “An Empirical Comparison of Default Swap Pricing Models”, Working Paper, Erasmus 
University Rotterdam, 2002:6. 
44 Hull, John; White, Alan, “Valuing Credit Default Swaps II: Modeling Default Correlations” Journal of Derivatives, 2001, vol. 8, 
no. 3,  
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Literature review 
This section provides an overview over related research. 
 
Several independent investigations have been done in order to compare the correlation of the 
pricing of credit risk between the bond market and the CDS market. Some of the central 
articles within the field are reviewed below. 
 
Blanco et al. test the validity of a theoretical arbitrage relation between the CDS prices to 
credit spreads, for a sample of 33 U.S. and European investment-grade firms, in the period 
2001–2002.45 They find that this relation holds on average over time for most companies, 
suggesting that the bond and CDS markets price credit risk equally. However, they note two 
forms of deviation from parity. First, for three of the European firms, the CDS prices are 
substantially higher than credit spreads for long periods of time. This might be explained by 
imperfections in the contract specification of the CDSs and measurement errors in computing 
the credit spread. Second, they notice short-lived deviations from parity for all the other 
companies, and subsequently show that these are a result of a clear lead for CDS prices over 
credit spreads in the price discovery process. 
 
Zhu makes a similar investigation of 24 banks and corporations, between 1999–2002, and 
consistent with previous studies, confirms the parity between the credit spread and CDS 
spread. However, the two spreads can differ substantially in the short run, which is explained 
by their different responses to changes in the credit quality of the underlying reference 
entities. Like Blanco et al, Zhu finds that the derivatives market leads the cash market, both in 
anticipating rating events and in price discovery. He also finds that market participants seem 
to use swap rates rather than treasury rates as the proxy for risk-free rates.46 
 
A more recent study is done by Dötz, who investigates to what extent the markets for 
corporate bonds and credit default swaps contribute to price discovery in credit markets, and 
which market dominates.47 Unlike most previous studies, Dötz investigates only European 
companies (36 enterprises). The data covers 2004–2006. Like previous studies, he finds 
arguments that support that a cointegrating relationship between CDS spreads and bond 
spreads exists, and that the CDS market dominates the price discovery process slightly.  
 
Other research has widened the scope to also include the instrument’s ability of forecasting 
rating events, mostly based on ratings from the three largest rating agencies, Standard & 
Poor’s, Moody’s and Fitch. One of the often cited articles is by Hull et al, who examine the 
relationship between bond yields, credit default swaps and rating announcements among a 
large number of corporations and sovereigns between 1998–2002.48 They find that CDS spreads 
are more efficient in anticipating negative rating events (downgrades), than positive.  
 
                                                     
45 Blanco et al. “An Empirical Analysis of the Dynamic Relation between Investment-Grade Bonds and Credit Default Swaps”, The 
Journal of Finance, Vol LX, no. 5, 2005 
46 Zhu, Haibin, ”An Empirical Comparison of Credit Spreads between the Bond Market and the Credit Default Swap Market”, 
Journal of Financial Services Research, 2006:3, p. 211-235. 
47 Dötz, Niko, “Time-varying contributions by the corporate bond and CDS markets to credit risk price discovery”, Discussion 
Paper: series 2: Banking and Financial Studies, no 08/2007, published by Deutsche Bundesbank, 
48 Hull, John; Predescu, Mirela; White Alan, “The relationship between credit default swap spreads, bond yields and credit rating 
announcements”, Journal of Banking and Finance, 2004:28, p. 2789-2811. 
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Similar conclusions are made by Daniels & Jensen who investigates the relation of CDS 
spreads, bond spreads and rating of 72 corporations within different industries during the time 
period 2000–2002.49 They find that the curves are highly related, but that there still are 
differences in the way the CDS spread and corporate bonds price credit risk. They also discover 
that the relationship between CDS spreads and credit spreads is stronger for non-investment 
grade corporations, and that changes in credit ratings are anticipated by both the bond market 
and the CDS market. 
 
As known to us, no research has yet been published that investigates the relation of the CDS 
spread and bond spread during the current financial crisis. This thesis aims to fill this gap. In 
order to have a basis for comparison, the period investigated date back to 2004-01-01, which 
gives an investigation period of almost 5 years. Most previous investigations comprises much 
shorter time periods. 
 
Problem discussion 
In this section the problem formulation and the purpose of the thesis are presented and 
explained. 
 
As seen above, the CDS spread should theoretically show the market’s pricing on credit risk.50 
However, empirical evidence shows that this is not always true.51 In addition, the discussions 
about the role of the CDSs within the time frame of the current credit crisis have been heard a 
number of times.52  
 
The thesis will investigate how well the CDS spreads of a number of financial corporations are 
related with their underlying bond spreads in the way that a long-run equilibrium relationship 
is searched for. The credit spread will also be studied to answer the question if credit risk is 
priced equally between derivatives market and the cash market. If it is not, it is possible that 
arbitrage possibilities arise. The thesis will also examine how the CDS spread has reacted (vis-
à-vis the bond spread) in the current credit crisis, as well as the years before.   
Problem formulation 
Is credit risk priced equally in the CDS market and the bond market? Is there a long-run 
equilibrium relationship between the CDS spreads and bond spreads? How have the CDS spreads 
behaved in the current credit crisis, compared to the time before the crisis? And are there any 
differences in the equilibrium relationship between the CDS spread and bond spread in times of 
financial distress, compared to during more stable market conditions? 
                                                     
49 Daniels, Kenneth N.; Jensen, Malene Shin, “The Effect of Credit Ratings on Credit Default Swap Spreads and Credit Spreads”, 
The Journal of Fixed Income, 2005:12,  vol. 15, p. 16-35. 
50 Zhu, Haibin, ”An Empirical Comparison of Credit Spreads between the Bond Market and the Credit Default Swap Market”, 
Journal of Financial Services Research, 2006:3, p. 211-235.  
51 See for example: “CDS goes its own merry way despite bad news”, Euroweek, Apr 18, 2008 
52 See for example Dickinson, Eric ”Credit Default Swaps: So Dear To Us, So Dangerous”, Working paper from Fordham Law 
School, 20 November 2008 
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Purpose 
The purpose of the thesis is to investigate the relationship between the CDS spreads and bond 
spreads, and to compare this relationship over time. This will be performed through testing for 
a cointegration relationship and Granger causality between the CDS spread and bond spreads 
of the entities studied, for different time periods, combined with the aid of descriptive 
statistics. Also the change in CDS spread and bond spread over time will be studied. 
 
Data 
This section describes how the data was chosen and collected, and which decisions were made 
regarding the CDS data, bond data and the time period(s) chosen. Also the problems we faced are 
accounted for. Finally, the main characteristics of the data are presented, in order to facilitate 
the reading of the method section. 
Selection of entities 
This examination covers banks and financial institutions, as underlying bond issuers for which 
CDSs exist. The population chosen is the entities classified as “financials” from the 
Standard&Poor’s indices S&P 500 and S&P 350.53 The reason for choosing US companies (S&P 
500) was twofold. First, as discussed above, the CDSs are argued to have played a role in the 
current turmoil that is also argued to have started in the US. Second, the US CDS market is 
very large and well developed, which makes it easy to find data for this area. Since the 
availability of data was too limited to construct a satisfactory amount of generic bonds, also 
entities from the European market (S&P 350) was chosen. Other reasons for this choice were 
that the crisis quickly spread to Europe, and that the availability of data was high for the 
entities in the index. The S&P 500 contains companies within the large-cap sector of the U.S. 
market and the S&P 350 index comprises corresponding European companies. The companies 
within the indices are considered “leading companies in leading industries”.54 The choice of a 
certain S&P index has the advantage in that the index is professionally checked to follow 
certain criteria, in order to provide a fair reflection of the market, with respect to market 
capitalization, public float and liquidity of the stocks.55 As an example, the companies included 
in the S&P 500 cover app. 75% of the U.S. equities market, and has a market capitalization of 
min. 4 billion USD. The companies included in the S&P 350 cover over 70% of the European 
equities market. The number of “financials” within each index amounts to app. 80 per year, for 
each index respectively. However, since there are some changes in the constituent list from 
year to year, the total number of companies in the population is 219.56 
 
One reason for investigating banks and financial institutions is that the financial crisis started 
within this sector, as described above. The CDSs were also invented, and are widely used, 
within this certain industry, which makes companies within this industry a suitable subject for 
investigation. The choice is also good for practical reasons, since there is a large CDS and bond 
market for this kind of enterprises. 
                                                     
53 The classification “financials” is based upon the GICS standard (Global Industry Classification Standard) 
54 Factsheet from S&P, available at http://www2.standardandpoors.com/spf/pdf/index/SP_500_Factsheet.pdf 
55 For a further description of the methodology of the index, please see “S&P U.S. Indices, Index Methodology” (21 pages) 
published by Standard&Poor’s, available at 
http://www2.standardandpoors.com/spf/pdf/index/S_P_US_Indices_Methodology_Web.pdf 
56 123  from S&P 500, and 96 from S&P 350. 
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CDS data 
Thomson Datastream is used to collect time-series data, showing the mid market price of the 
CDSs for each company. Data for the spreads of 5-year CDSs are used, since contracts with this 
particular maturity are the most liquid, and are therefore considered to provide the most true 
market prices.57 For the companies from S&P 500, only contracts denominated in USD was 
chosen, and for the companies of S&P 350, only contracts in EUR was chosen.  
 
However, the chosen S&P indices contain many companies for which no CDSs exist. Therefore, 
the population has subsequently been cleared from the entities for which a CDS market either 
not exists, or where the data does not cover the entire period investigated.  
 
For the vast majority of listed companies, there is no information about the CDS spread before 
2004-01-01, which makes this date a natural start date of the investigation. 
Bond data 
To be able to compare the price of a 5-year CDS with a bond, the ideal situation would be if 
there was a bond issued by the same entity with exactly 5 years to maturity available for each 
day. For natural reasons, this is not the case. Therefore, generic bonds must be constructed. To 
do this, we use the process elaborated by Zhu, and proceed in the following manner:58 
 
For each of the chosen reference entities (where data of CDS spread is available), information 
about all bonds outstanding during the sample period is collected. To avoid measurement 
errors only bond issues that satisfy the following restrictions are used:  
(i) bonds must be straight (i.e. not puttable, callable, convertible or reverse 
convertible) 
(ii) bonds must be denominated in the same currency as the CDS contract (USD or 
EUR) 
(iii) bonds must be senior 
(iv) the coupon payments must be fixed-term 
 
First, at each date, it is checked for if there is a bond with exactly 5 years to maturity. If this is 
not the case, two quoted bonds are selected at each date: one whose maturity is shorter than, 
and another whose maturity is longer than the default swap’s maturity. Their spreads are 
subsequently linearly interpolated. The following criteria are set: 
 
(i) At least one of the two bonds must have a remaining time to maturity between 3.5 
years and 6.5 years.  
(ii) If no bond data are available for interpolation, but there is a quoted bond whose 
maturity is between 4.5 years and 5.5 years, its yield is used as an approximation for 
the yield of the generic bond. 
 
                                                     
57 Dötz, Niko, “Time-varying contributions by the corporate bond and CDS markets to credit risk price discovery”, Discussion 
Paper: series 2: Banking and Financial Studies, no 08/2007, published by Deutsche Bundesbank. 
58 Zhu, Haibin, ”An Empirical Comparison of Credit Spreads between the Bond Market and the Credit Default Swap Market”, 
Journal of Financial Services Research, 2006:3, p. 211-235. 
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Similar methods are used by for example Blanco et al, Norden & Weber and Hull et al.59 The 
population is thereby cleaned from entities whose bond issued did not fulfil the criteria for 
making it possible to construct generic bonds.60 The limited accessibility of appropriate bonds 
is the main reason behind the reduction of the sample size.  
 
Thomson Datastream provides data for the bond spreads. Both the yield over risk free rate 
(expressed as bond spread over swap rate) and information about the remaining time to 
maturity for each bond is compiled. (As concluded above, the swap rate is considered to give 
the best proxy for risk free rate.)  
 
Time period 
The period investigated is 2004-01-01 to 2008-11-24. The start date is set due to data availability 
(in Datastream). The first years are characterised by quite normal market conditions, and the 
last app. 16 months are characterised by the financial crisis, which will give a good comparison.  
 
As a second step the time period is divided in sub-periods. Since a part of the scope is to 
investigate how the CDS market has reacted to the current credit crisis, one suitable sub-
period is the period from the start of the crisis, until the end date of the data collected. As 
discussed in the chapter about the credit crisis, it is always difficult to set an exact start date of 
a crisis, as well as define a “crisis”, and the choice easily tends to be arbitrary to a certain 
extent. However, based on the earlier discussion, the sub-period characterised by the crisis is 
set to 2007-08-09 to 2008-11-24. For the reason of comparison, also two periods before the 
crisis are defined, and the dates of these are set based on the criteria that the compared 
periods should contain the same number of days (338 trade days) as the “crisis” period. The 
three sub periods are the following:  
 
Period 1: 2005-01-05 to 2006-04-21 
Period 2: 2006-04-22 to 2007-08-08 
Period 3: 2007-08-09 to 2008-11-24 
List of reference entities 
When the population (starting at 219 entities) is cleared for companies for which either no CDS 
data was available, or for which it was not possible to create generic bonds, 29 corporations 
remain: 18 from USA and 11 from Europe. The companies included in the sample are shown in 
figure 2.  
                                                     
59 Blanco et al. “An Empirical Analysis of the Dynamic Relation between Investment-Grade Bonds and Credit Default Swaps”, The 
Journal of Finance, Vol LX, no. 5, 2005,  
Norden, Lars; Weber, Martin, “Informational efficiency of credit default swap and stock markets: The impact of credit rating 
announcments”, Journal of Banking and Finance, 2004:28, p. 2813-2843,  
Hull, John; White, Alan, “Valuing Credit Default Swaps II: Modeling Default Correlations” Journal of Derivatives, 2001, vol. 8, no. 3. 
60 Practically, due to the large amount of data, the generic bonds are created by running an Excel-makro written in Visual Basic.  
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Table 1: List of reference entities included in the sample 
 
Name 
 
Country 
 
Index 
 
Currency  
ABN Amro Holding NV Netherlands S&P 350 EUR 
Allstate Corp. USA S&P 500 USD 
Avalonbay Communities USA S&P 500 USD 
Banca Monte dei Paschi di 
Siena SpA 
Italy S&P 350 EUR 
Banco Santander SA Spain S&P 350 EUR 
Bank of America Corp. USA S&P 500 USD 
Barclays Great Britain S&P 350 EUR 
Bear Stearns USA S&P 500 USD 
BNP Paribas SA France S&P 350 EUR 
Citigroup Inc. USA S&P 500 USD 
Commerzbank AG Germany S&P 350 EUR 
Credit Agricole France S&P 350 EUR 
Deutsche Bank Germany S&P 350 EUR 
Developers Diversified Rlty USA S&P 500 USD 
Fannie Mae  
(Federal National Mortgage 
Association) 
USA S&P 500 USD 
Fortis Group Belgium S&P 350 EUR 
Freddie Mac  
(Federal Home Loan Mortgage 
Corporation) 
USA S&P 500 USD 
Goldman Sachs Group USA S&P 500 USD 
Investor Sweden S&P 350 EUR 
Kimco Realty USA S&P 500 USD 
Lincoln National USA S&P 500 USD 
Marsh & McLennan USA S&P 500 USD 
Merril Lynch USA S&P 500 USD 
Morgan Stanley USA S&P 500 USD 
SLM Corporation USA S&P 500 USD 
Simon Property Group USA S&P 500 USD 
Societe Generale France S&P 350 EUR 
Wells Fargo USA S&P 500 USD 
Wachovia Corp. USA S&P 500 USD 
 
Description of the data 
In all, data for 1,278 days and for 29 entities was collected, which gives 37,602 observations of 
the CDS spread, and the same number of observations for the bond spread.  
 
To give the reader an example of the characteristics of the data, the figure below shows the 
graph of the CDS spread and Bond spread over time, for Citigroup. Although there are 
exceptions, many of the entities included in the sample show similar movements in the 
spreads.  
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Figure 2: Citigroup, CDS spread and bond spread 
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As can be seen, the spreads, both for bonds and CDS are drastically higher in the last app. 16 
month of the time period investigated. The same tendency is seen for almost all entities in the 
sample. As regards the CDS spread, all the entities have a higher average spread for period 3, 
the “during the crisis period” than for period 1 and 2. When it comes to bond spreads, the same 
is true for 26 of 29 entities for period 1, and 27 out of 29 entities for period 2. 
 
The table below presents the average spreads. It can be noted that the average difference 
between CDS spread and bond spreads is drastically higher in period 3. The average standard 
deviation of the credit spread seems also to increase during the time of the crisis. 
 
In some cases, the bond spread is negative. This is in cases where the bond yield is lower than 
the swap rate. This could happen at times when the risk for a certain company’s bond is 
considered to have lower risk than the swap rate.  
 
In Zhu’s investigation, the average credit spread was 14.91 bps (and CDS spread > bond spread), 
but the difference between the years was large (between 1.44 and 32.2). The investigation 
covered 1999–2002. Dötz found that the difference was 3.6 bps. 
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Table 1: Summary – Average Spreads for the different periods 
 
Total period Period 1 Period 2 Period 3
2004-01-01 to 
2008-11-24
2005-01-05 to 
2006-04-21
2006-04-22 to 
2007-08-08
2007-08-09 to     
2008-11-24
CDS spread, 
arithmetic mean 52.47 21.72 19.34 136.31
Bond spread, 
arithmetic mean 87.52 54.03 28.69 195.03
Credit spread, 
arithmetic mean* 35.04 32.30 9.35 58.73
Std. deviation of the 
credit spread 73.41 31.39 30.62 83.26
*Credit spread = Bond spread - CDS spread  
 
When looking at which spread is the highest, CDS or Bond, there is no strong dominance. (The 
complete table is presented in appendix 3.) Even though the bond spread is higher than the 
CDS spread in average, as shown above, this is true only for 64% of the observations for the 
total period. The dominance of the bond is strongest in the third period, where the bond 
spread is higher than the CDS spread in 70% of the observations, compared to 64% in period 2, 
and 59% in period 1.  
 
Method 
This section provides an overview of the method used. 
 
As stated above, according to economic theory, an arbitrage relationship should exist between 
the spread of the credit default swap and the bond yield over the risk-free rate. In other words, 
there is to be at least a long-term relationship between the prices of both financial 
instruments. A way of testing for this situation is to investigate if there are any cointegrating 
relationships present between the two variables in the dataset. If cointegration is found, there 
exists a long-term equilibrium relationship between the CDS spread and bond spread. 
 
There has been proposed that using ordinary regression techniques when studying the 
connection between time-series may lead to undesirable results and spurious regressions61, 
thus making it interesting to investigate alternative methods to use. Granger and Engle was 
awarded the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences 2003 by contributing research on 
cointegration62, most of the method used in this chapter are based on this framework. 
 
A first step is to decide if the series in the data can be classified as stationary or not. Two or 
more stationary series cannot be proved to cointegrate and thus do not have the relationship 
that is tested for in the Engle-Granger or Johansen procedures. Whether stationarity is found 
or not, a Granger causality test is performed on each pair of series to investigate which market 
may be the price-discovering one, in the way that in this market the price seems to move first  
(as in acting on market information) of the two. The last test also tells us if there may or not 
                                                     
61 Brooks, Chris, Introductory Econometrics for Finance, Cambridge University Press 2008, p. 319 
62 “The Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel 2003” available at 
http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economics/laureates/2003/ 
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may still be a connection between the two spreads in the case where cointegration could not 
be proven. The Granger causality test is made in all cases, even if the presence of a 
cointegrating relationship would prove more valuable when searching for an equilibrium 
relationship. 
 
All of the tests above are performed on the full dataset, as well as the three sub samples. This is 
made to try to capture the effects of the ‘credit crunch’ in comparison to regular market 
conditions. The results and analyses are given in the following chapters. 
 
Testing for stationarity or unit root, KPSS and ADF   
A first step before deciding on further testing methods is to investigate the properties of the 
time series data. A stationary series may be defined as one with a constant mean, constant 
variance and constant autovariance for each given lag of itself.63 When subject to shocks, the 
change in the variable will gradually die away with time in contrast to series containing one or 
more unit roots, where the effect of shocks persists over time. The random walk model with 
drift, yt = µ + yt−1 + ut , is a good illustration of this non-stationary process.  
 
Regressing series containing unit roots may yield results not true to reality such as too high R2 
and other undesirable properties, a phenomenon also known as spurious regression. An 
interesting property of non-stationary series is that its first difference (or period-to-period 
change) is stationary, a transformation that may be of use if there is interest in formally testing 
its behaviour.  
 
 
 
Figure 3: stationary I(0) time series (Goldman Sachs 1:st diff CDS spread) 
 
 
 
                                                     
63 Brooks, Chris, Introductory Econometrics for Finance, Cambridge University Press 2008, p. 318. 
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Figure 4: Unit root I(1) time series (Goldman Sachs CDS spread) 
 
 
To decide whether the series is stationary or not, the Augmented Dickey-fuller test (ADF) and 
the KPSS tests are employed. The former tests for a unit root and the later for stationarity. The 
ADF has a null hypothesis of H0: series contain a unit root and H1: series is stationary. 
 
The ADF is performed by testing for ψ = 0  in the model: ∆y t =ψy t−1 +
i=1
p
Σαy t−1 + ut . The test 
statistic is 
ˆ ψ 
(SE ( ˆ ψ )ˆ )  , the critical values used are given by Brooks.
64 
 
A problem that may arise is the choice of lags in the testing procedure, In this case, 10 was 
somewhat arbitrarily chosen to count down from (to check for best significance of lags and the 
model in total) in a first step and was later complemented by the AIC (Akaikes Information 
Criterion) and SBIC (Schwartz Baynesian Information Criterion) in EViews. The goal is to 
minimize the numerical value of the information criterion with consideration to the number of 
lags. No longer lags are to be expected considering the price-relationship examined. Arbitrage 
should eliminate differences rather quickly in any liquid market. 
 
The AIC is expressed as AIC = ln( ˆ σ 2) + 2k
T
 wherein σ 2 is the residual variance, T the number 
of observations and k the total numbers of parameters estimated. The SBIC is expressed as 
SBIC = ln( ˆ σ 2) + k
T
lnT  using the same parameters and variables.  
 
However, the material did not seem to exhibit any major sensitivity to differences in the 
selected lag range.  
 
                                                     
64 Brooks, Chris, Introductory Econometrics for Finance, Cambridge University Press 2008, p. 623. 
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As a way to make the conclusions more robust, as suggested by Brooks65, the test for a unit 
root is complemented by a KPSS (named after its originators: Kwiatkowski, Phillips, Schmidt 
and Shin) test for stationarity. Here we test for H0:I(0) against H1:I(1) 
 
If y can be illustrated as yt = µ + ut  and ut  is a stationary process with mean zero, the sample 
average of yt  is a consistent estimate of and the long-run variance of ut  is a finite and well-
defined number under H0. 
 
The test statistic is η = i=1
TΣ t2S
T 2 ˆ σ 2
 and critical values are given in the GRETL software’s testing 
procedure itself. The number of lags used in the KPSS test is the same tested and found to be 
optimal for the variables in each ADF test. 
 
Cointegration and Granger causality, Engle-Granger, Johansen and Granger tests 
In searching for a cointegrating relationship between two variables y1 and y2  that both 
contain an unit root I(1) you look for the residuals of the linear combination of the two y’s to 
have the property I(0).  
 
In the following models, the different y’s represent the levels of the cds and bond spreads as 
before. 
 
A formal definition of cointegration by Engle and Granger follows: 66 If w is a k*1 vector 
containing variables, the components of w are all integrated by the order of (d,b) when 
- All of w’s components are I(d) 
- At least one vector of coefficients α  exists so α 'wt ~ I(d − d)  
If no cointegration is found, there is no indication of a long-term relationship between the 
tested variables. 
 
A generalized way of describing the procedure is that with k variables being investigated for 
cointegration, the residuals ut  from the equation yt = β1 + β2x2t + β3x3t + ....βk xkt + ut  will be 
I(0) if a cointegration relationship is present. 
 
The test performed to find out if ut  is I(0) is using the same ADF-methodology used in testing 
the separate variables before, but this time a different set of critical values are used because of 
now testing residuals. The test is referred to as the Engle-Granger test and Brooks again gives 
critical values.67 The AIK, SBIC and as a last resort the counting down method are used for 
choice of lags. 
 
To provide further information considering whether a cointegrating relationship exists, the 
Johansen technique based on VARs is used to search for a cointegrating vector connecting the 
two series. 
 
A VAR(Vector Autoregressive model) with g variables and k lags is illustrated in VAR and 
VECM (Vector Error Correction Model)form by: 
 
                                                     
65 ibid p. 331 
66 Engle, R. F; Granger, C. W. J., ”Co-Integration and Error Correction: Representation, Estimation and Testing, Econometrica 
1987:55. 
67 Brooks, Chris, Introductory Econometrics for Finance, Cambridge University Press 2008, p 628 
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VAR:  yt = β1yt−1 + β1yt−2 + ...+ βk yt−k + u 
 
VECM:  ∆y t = Πy t−k + Γ1∆y t−1 + Γ1∆y t−2 + ...+ Γk−1∆y t−(k−1) + ut  
 
Π is ( i=1
kΣ βi) −1g  and Γi  is ( j=1iΣ βj) − Ig  
 
The Johansen test examines the long-run coefficient matrix Π and its rank via the matrix Eigen 
values. The values are studied in ascending order were λ1 is largest root (closest to one) and 
λg is the smallest. When no cointegration is found, the rank of Π will not significantly differ 
from zero. 
The test statistic used is λtrace (r) = −T
i= r+1
g
Σ ln(1− ˆ λ i)  and critical values are given in the EViews 
software used for the testing (checked against Brooks values). 68 H0 is that the number of 
cointegrating vectors are less than or equal to r against the alternative that there are more. The 
test is performed in a sequence. If H0: r=0 is rejected, the null that there is one cointegrating 
vector (i.e. H0: r=1) would be tested. Since g (number of variables) = 2 there are only r=1 
cointegrating vectors to investigate. Brooks elaborates more on the quite intricate Johansen 
testing technique in his book Introductory Econometrics for Finance.69 
 
Finally, the Granger causality between CDS spread and bond yield over the risk free rate are 
tested to examine if the markets not proved to have a cointegrating relationship still may move 
together. These tests are run on all entities. 
 
The software runs every possible equation of the form 
 
yt = α0 + α1yt−1 + ...+ α l yt−1 + β1xt−1 + ...+ βl x−l + εt  
xt = α0 + α1xt−1 + ...+ α l xt−1 + β1yt−1 + ...+ βl y− l + ut  
 
given every combination of x and y series in the group (where x and y are the CDS and bond 
spreads) including lags and then reports the F-statistics for β1 = β2 = ....= β l = 0 
 
H0 is that x does not G-cause y in the first regression and the same goes for y and x in the 
second. Brooks gives the critical values for the F-tests.70 
Test results 
In this section, the results of the tests are presented. First, the results for the complete period are 
presented, thereafter the results for the sub-periods follow. 
 
                                                     
68 Brooks, Chris, Introductory Econometrics for Finance, Cambridge University Press 2008, p 625 
69 Brooks, Chris, Introductory Econometrics for Finance, Cambridge University Press 2008, p 350–355 
70
 Brooks, Chris, Introductory Econometrics for Finance, Cambridge University Press 2008, p 618 
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Table 2: Unit root and cointegration tests for the complete period, 2004-01-01 to 2008-11-24 
Company Unit root and stationarity tests Cointegration tests
H0:No 
cointegrating 
equation
H0: r=1 
cointegrating 
vector exists
CDS Spreads Bond Yields Engle/Granger Johansen
ADF KPSS ADF KPSS ADF Trace Stat
Allstate Corp - **** - **** ***  14.04399*
Amro Bank - **** - **** *  0.211969
Avalon Bay - **** - **** ***  19.97770*
Banca Paschi - **** - **** -  2.395344
Banco Santander - **** - **** -  3.219033
Bank of America - **** - **** -  1.036899
Barclays - **** - **** -  0.003448
Bear Stearns **** **** - **** ***  1.700480
BNP Paribas - **** - **** ***  1.687035
Citigroup - **** - **** ***  0.017730
Commerzbank - **** *** **** -  5.632254*
Credit Agricole - **** - **** -  0.012850
Deutsche Bank - **** - **** ***  0.539458
Developers Dvrsf - **** - **** ***  38.17143*
Fannie Mae - **** - **** -  0.157056
Fortis NL - **** - **** -  0.887945
Freddie Mac - **** - **** **  1.285915
Goldman Sachs - **** - **** **  0.686447
Investor - **** - **** ***  1.654881
Kimco - **** - **** ***  20.82038*
Lincoln - **** - **** -  8.444370*
Marsh McLennan **** **** - **** **  1.868867
Merril Lynch - **** - **** ***  0.799274
Morgan Stanley - **** - **** ***  5.031263*
Simon Property - **** - **** ***  55.62257*
SLM Corp - **** - **** ***  1.784499
Societe General - **** - **** -  2.037201
Wachovia Corp ** **** - **** **  13.39102*
Wells Fargo - **** - **** ***  4.917691*
Rejected at Rejected at Rejected at 
 **** = 99% *** = 99% * = 95% level
*** = 97,5% ** = 95%
** = 95% * = 90%
* = 90%
- Not Rejected
ADF Test H0:I(1)         
KPSS Test H0:I(0)
- Not Rejected  
Unit root and stationarity tests 
As can be seen, the hypothesis that the data is stationary (KPSS-test), can be rejected at the 
99% level for both bonds and CDS for all reference entities. However, the ADF-test for unit 
roots is rejected in three cases regarding the CDS spread, and one regarding the bond spread. 
The test results indicate that most of the data could contain a unit root, and this leads us to 
assume that this data is non-stationary.  
 
Cointegration tests 
The ADF test within the Engle-Granger procedure shows that for 19 out of 29 entities, the 
hypothesis that no cointegrating relationship exist, can be rejected (on 95% and 99% level, in 
most cases). The Johansen test shows that the hypothesis that a cointegrating vector exist can 
be rejected for 10 companies (out of 29). However, these are not necessarily the same entities, 
for which the hypothesis was not rejected in the ADF test.  
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Table 3: Unit root and cointegration tests for Period 1, 2005-01-05 to 2006-04-21 
Company Unit root and stationarity tests Cointegration tests
H0:No 
cointegrating 
equation
H0: r=1 
cointegrating 
vector exists
CDS Spreads Bond Yields Engle/Granger Johansen
ADF KPSS ADF KPSS ADF Trace Stat
Allstate Corp - **** * **** -  3.138110
Amro Bank - **** - **** -  2.874239
Avalon Bay - **** - **** -  1.776801
Banca Paschi - **** - **** -  3.406410
Banco Santander - **** - **** -  3.364937
Bank of America - **** - **** -  2.201524
Barclays - **** - **** -  2.323694
Bear Stearns - **** - **** *  2.898033
BNP Paribas - **** *** **** -  2.053009
Citigroup - **** **** *** -  2.462212
Commerzbank - **** - **** -  2.351910
Credit Agricole - **** - **** -  1.397390
Deutsche Bank - **** - **** -  3.311334
Developers Dvrsf ** **** - **** **  0.617585
Fannie Mae - **** - **** -  1.069649
Fortis NL - **** - **** *  3.553904
Freddie Mac - **** - **** -  3.409041
Goldman Sachs - **** - **** **  4.532134*
Investor * **** * **** **  0.296304
Kimco - **** - **** -  7.161910*
Lincoln **** **** ** **** -  7.230685*
Marsh McLennan - **** - **** **  6.641594*
Merril Lynch - **** * **** *  3.809953
Morgan Stanley - **** * **** -  2.400940
Simon Property - **** *** **** -  1.536563
SLM Corp - **** - **** -  1.067098
Societe General - **** - **** -  2.135901
Wachovia Corp - **** **** **** -  3.555081
Wells Fargo - **** * **** -  3.639147
Rejected at Rejected at Rejected at 
 **** = 99% *** = 99% * = 95% level
*** = 97,5% ** = 95%
** = 95% * = 90%
* = 90%
- Not Rejected- Not Rejected
ADF Test H0:I(1)         
KPSS Test H0:I(0)
 
Unit root and stationarity tests 
Like for the complete period, the hypothesis that the data is stationary (KPSS-test), can be 
rejected at the 99% level for both bonds and CDS for all reference entities. However, the ADF-
test for unit roots is rejected in three cases regarding the CDS spread, and ten cases regarding 
the bond spread. The test results indicate that most of the data may contain a unit root, and 
this leads us to assume that this data is non-stationary.  
 
Cointegration tests 
The ADF test within the Engle-Granger procedure shows that for 22 out of 29 entities, the 
hypothesis that no cointegrating relationship exist, can not be rejected (on 95% and 99% level, 
in most cases). The Johansen test shows that the hypothesis that a cointegrating vector exists 
can be rejected for 4 companies (out of 29). However, these are not necessarily the same 
entities, for which the hypothesis was not rejected in the ADF test.  
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Table 4: Unit root and cointegration tests for Period 2, 2006-04-22 to 2007-08-08 
 
 
Company Unit root and stationarity tests Cointegration tests
H0:No 
cointegrating 
equation
H0: r=1 
cointegrating 
vector exists
CDS Spreads Bond Yields Engle/Granger Johansen
ADF KPSS ADF KPSS ADF Trace Stat
Allstate Corp - **** - **** -  4.583825*
Amro Bank - *** - **** -  0.162580
Avalon Bay - **** *** **** -  1.298320
Banca Paschi - ** - **** -  3.929172*
Banco Santander - - - **** -  0.076904
Bank of America - **** - **** -  1.297424
Barclays - ** - **** -  3.412302
Bear Sterns - **** - **** -  3.946787*
BNP Paribas - * - ** -  0.110613
Citigroup - **** - **** -  1.214915
Commerzbank - - - **** -  7.802125*
Credit Agricole - *** - *** -  5.112425*
Deutsche Bank - *** - *** -  1.075582
Developers Dvrsf - **** * **** -  1.262187
Fannie Mae - **** - **** -  0.723104
Fortis NL **** * -  0.126226
Freddie Mac - **** - **** -  1.656288
Goldman Sachs - **** - * -  0.748034
Investor - **** - **** -  5.795311*
Kimco - **** - **** -  1.461156
Lincoln - **** - **** -  1.977424
Marsh McLennan - **** - **** -  3.983803*
Merril Lynch - **** - **** -  5.822345*
Morgan Stanley - **** - **** -  2.015350
Simon Property - * - **** -  5.714174*
SLM Corp - **** - **** ***  0.746820
Societe General - *** **** **** -  1.405445
Wachovia Corp - **** - **** -  2.542108
Wells Fargo - *** - **** -  1.362294
Rejected at Rejected at Rejected at 
 **** = 99% *** = 99% * = 95% level
*** = 97,5% ** = 95%
** = 95% * = 90%
* = 90%
- Not Rejected
ADF Test H0:I(1)         
KPSS Test H0:I(0)
- Not Rejected  
 
Unit root and stationarity tests 
Like in the test for the complete period, the hypothesis that the data is stationary (KPSS-test), 
can be rejected, however, with lower probability, and with an exception for the CDS spread of 
two entities. However, the ADF-test for unit roots is rejected in three cases regarding the bond 
spread. As in the test for the previous test for the complete period, test results indicate that 
most of the data could contain a unit root, and this leads us to assume that this data is non-
stationary.  
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Cointegration tests 
The ADF test within the Engle-Granger procedure shows that for only one entity, the 
hypothesis that no cointegrating relationship exists can be rejected. The Johansen test shows 
that the hypothesis that a cointegrating vector exists can be rejected for 9 companies (out of 
29).  
 
Table 5: Unit root and cointegration tests for period 3, 2007-08-09 to 2008-11-24 
Company Unit root and stationarity tests Cointegration tests
H0:No 
cointegrating 
equation
H0: r=1 
cointegrating 
vector exists
CDS Spreads Bond Yields Engle/Granger Johansen
ADF KPSS ADF KPSS ADF Trace Stat
Allstate Corp - **** - **** ***  3.825213*
Amro Bank - **** - *** -  3.825213
Avalon Bay - **** - **** -  5.110221*
Banca Paschi - **** - ** -  1.108426
Banco Santander - **** - **** -  0.021239
Bank of America - **** - **** -  0.019676
Barclays - **** - **** -  1.136809
Bear Stearns ** ** - **** -  3.876437*
BNP Paribas * **** - **** -  3.983305*
Citigroup - **** - **** **  0.853059
Commerzbank - **** - **** -  0.550813
Credit Agricole - **** - **** -  0.799015
Deutsche Bank - **** * **** -  6.484201*
Developers Dvrsf - **** - **** -  10.24387*
Fannie Mae - ** - **** -  0.007201
Fortis NL - **** - **** -  0.026804
Freddie Mac - *** - **** -  3.454825
Goldman Sachs - **** - **** **  0.859073
Investor - **** - **** -  1.872109
Kimco - **** - **** -  2.957338
Lincoln - **** - **** *  4.570968*
Marsh McLennan - ** - **** -  1.730160
Merril Lynch - **** - **** -  0.620772
Morgan Stanley - **** - **** ***  3.031852
Simon Property - **** - **** **  16.14024*
SLM Corp - **** - **** **  3.625044
Societe General - **** - * -  4.095696*
Wachovia Corp * **** - **** -  8.533172*
Wells Fargo - **** - **** -  0.210460
Rejected at Rejected at Rejected at 
 **** = 99% *** = 99% * = 95% level
*** = 97,5% ** = 95%
** = 95% * = 90%
* = 90%
- Not Rejected
ADF Test H0:I(1)         
KPSS Test H0:I(0)
- Not Rejected  
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Unit root and stationarity tests 
The hypothesis that the data is stationary (KPSS-test) can be rejected with slightly higher 
probability than for the early period, and with slightly higher probability than for the complete 
period. As in the test for the complete period the ADF-test for unit roots is rejected in three 
cases regarding the CDS spread and one case for the bond spreads. 
 
However, the ADF-test for unit roots is rejected in three cases regarding the bond spread. As in 
the test for the previous test for the complete period, test results indicate that most of the data 
could contain a unit root, and this leads us to assume that this data is non-stationary.  
 
 
Cointegration tests 
The ADF test within the Engle-Granger procedure shows that for only one entity, the 
hypothesis that no cointegrating relationship exists can be rejected. The Johansen test shows 
that the hypothesis that a cointegrating vector exists can be rejected for 9 companies (out of 
29).  
 
 
Granger causality tests 
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Table 6: Test statistics, Granger causality test, complete period 
 
Granger causality F-statistic F-statistic
CDS causes 
Bond
Bond causes 
CDS
Allstate Corp  45.1752  8.03038
Amro Bank  1.55822  2.71628
Avalon Bay  33.0046  70.6407
Banca Paschi  5.01141  2.31765
Banco Santander  1.00733  0.14029
Bank of America  12.5119  143.462
Barclays  1.45148  51.4178
Bear Stearns  4.18409  41.9074
BNP Paribas  1.16547  5.95489
Citigroup  17.0917  293.683
Commerzbank  0.22483  0.28452
Credit Agricole  1.25504  3.62902
Deutsche Bank  6.54483  12.2482
Developers Dvrsf  79.3743  1.48936
Fannie Mae  1.44446  1.21190
Fortis NL  3.34836  15.3362
Freddie Mac  7.36121  5.52683
Goldman Sachs  55.3745  2.67074
Investor  137.986  11.9998
Kimco  14.6181  18.5950
Lincoln  18.3346  29.7008
Marsh McLennan  19.8036  7.46265
Merril Lynch  33.8307  9.43593
Morgan Stanley  36.5079  20.2808
Simon Property  45.0592  21.7752
SLM Corp  107.645  24.4543
Societe General  5.39808  1.31936
Wachovia Corp  40.9273  18.2227
Wells Fargo  18.2945  6.81013
n=602
H0: series y does not granger cause series y2
If H0 is rejected, the result is in bold.  
 
For the total period, the Granger causality test indicates that for all entities except for two, 
there is significant evidence that CDS spread Granger-causes bond spread, and the same is 
valid for the contrary case. 
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Table 7: Granger causality test for period 1–3 
 
 
Period 1 Period 2 Period 3
Granger causality F-statistic F-statistic F-statistic F-statistic F-statistic F-statistic
CDS causes 
Bond
Bond causes 
CDS
CDS 
causes 
Bond
Bond causes 
CDS
CDS 
causes 
Bond
Bond 
causes 
CDS
Allstate Corp  1.44788  1.66969  2.01389  4.22921  7.90344  1.41147
Amro Bank  0.61591  0.31170  3.11761  3.77715  1.54977  0.62113
Avalon Bay  1.57150  0.31672  1.08995  2.33505  6.18484  18.0136
Banca Paschi  1.70398  0.62427  2.16823  3.63093  2.10452  1.07193
Banco Santander  0.30854  4.63495  0.35265  10.4310  2.14279  0.72891
Bank of America  1.08808  1.83025  0.40788  1.45100  1.94485  0.78378
Barclays  3.17483  0.44066  7.53451  0.02732  1.03433  0.06720
Bear Stearns  1.05572  1.04993  4.79581  1.24703  1.55796  0.86034
BNP Paribas  3.70192  0.49175  2.94830  2.10005  35.2447  1.50385
Citigroup  1.21845  1.74625  2.32342  0.51547  0.54435  1.90035
Commerzbank  0.20099  2.65211  1.70458  3.35001  26.0830  2.91530
Credit Agricole  0.62741  0.99944  1.96083  3.45236  21.1991  3.61003
Deutsche Bank  0.53406  1.15138  3.32739  1.27171  7.83241  22.4670
Developers Dvrsf  0.63252  1.15031  4.41878  0.55566  1.83243  0.28292
Fannie Mae  1.48462  1.31251  9.15286  3.43796  35.8574  2.24079
Fortis NL  3.12261  0.36038  29.3097  0.38328  1.63762  9.95579
Freddie Mac  1.93052  0.44992  3.43942  0.35936  1.22377  0.97290
Goldman Sachs  0.31022  0.24695  0.37105  0.42469  40.3451  5.07308
Investor  4.89452  0.54393  0.93659  2.29077  38.9791  3.36340
Kimco  0.83554  1.72924  3.13261  3.21967  2.71437  5.66591
Lincoln  2.09084  1.20666  1.47705  1.32419  6.43099  19.3780
Marsh McLennan  3.92880  2.15226  7.56885  2.52839  7.69628  5.64857
Merril Lynch  3.43768  2.78771  14.9796  18.1406  11.5466  0.77328
Morgan Stanley  1.10338  1.77762  4.60027  3.08679  58.5259  3.61316
Simon Property  3.16480  2.50540  5.35716  3.76069  12.7920  8.61228
SLM Corp  2.95566  1.54945  13.1618  2.09350  19.7205  4.82349
Societe General  2.91930  1.66233  1.56143  0.26079  2.93240  1.82726
Wachovia Corp  1.41125  0.93202  14.2114  3.11782  196.853  1.75143
Wells Fargo  1.50609  0.71668  3.82337  3.81878  4.77944  1.03064
n=338 for each period
H0: series y does not granger cause series y2
If H0 is rejected, the result is in bold.  
 
As can be seen, the hypothesis that one of the series Granger does not cause the other one can 
be rejected in most cases.  There is slight variation in what causality occurs between the 
different time periods, although there is no strong trend observable. The number of entities for 
which both the hypothesis that “bond G-causes CDS”, and “CDS G-causes bond” are rejected, is 
somewhat larger in the second and third period, suggesting that the Granger causality is less 
often to be found in periods 2 and 3. However, due to the quite small data set, the changes that 
have taken place are difficult to draw any general conclusions from, by looking at the results.  
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Blanco et al noted that the CDSs had a clear lead in the price discovery process.71 For most of 
our entities a one-way causality has not been found, although for the minority of spreads 
where such relationship exists, the CDS are found to G-cause bonds during the separate 
periods.  
 
Validity and Reliability 
This section highlights the advantages and disadvantages of the study, in relation to validity and 
reliability.  
 
The choice of CDSs and bonds itself is based on the arbitrage formula mentioned above,  
s = y – r, and therefore deemed valid in testing the pricing of risk in each company. The S&P 
350 & 500 consists of large companies believed to have a more liquid bond and CDS market 
than smaller entities, thus making for a good choice to study. The amount of trades and the 
large amount of information regarding these companies is believed to make the prices of the 
different financial instruments studied more likely to be correctly set by the market and thus 
the conclusions made by analyzing these more generalizable. Daily measurements are made 
because of the connection between CDSs and bonds, arbitrage should make the prices quickly 
adapt and therefore weekly or monthly averages would probably not be able to show this 
process. 
 
Another issue is the choice of proxy for risk-free rate in the actual arbitrage relationship. It 
could be argued that the drastically increased interbank rates of the last year makes the swap 
rate, which is used here, a less good choice. However, no other alternatives, to us known, have 
yet been scientifically proven to give a better proxy in this actual case. 
 
The process in the investigation most prone to creating errors may be the construction of 
generic bonds. A problem that in some cases have arisen is that by using limited amount of 
bonds to create a generic bond, sometimes untimely ’jumps’ in the generic bond series appear 
as illustrated below. The reason behind the phenomena is the differing spreads of the 
companies’ issued bonds. In most cases, the method employed gives results that seem 
reasonable but the big trade-off is that many companies do not have enough outstanding 
bonds possessing the criteria needed to create a generic bond and thus making it impossible to 
include the entity in the test. 
 
Figure 1: Example of Banco Santander 
                                                     
71
 
Blanco et al. “An Empirical Analysis of the Dynamic Relation between Investment-Grade Bonds and Credit Default Swaps”, The Journal of Finance, Vol LX, no. 
5, 2005
. 
 34
-400
-300
-200
-100
0
100
200
300
400
20
04
-
01
-
01
20
04
-
05
-
01
20
04
-
09
-
01
20
05
-
01
-
01
20
05
-
05
-
01
20
05
-
09
-
01
20
06
-
01
-
01
20
06
-
05
-
01
20
06
-
09
-
01
20
07
-
01
-
01
20
07
-
05
-
01
20
07
-
09
-
01
20
08
-
01
-
01
20
08
-
05
-
01
20
08
-
09
-
01
CDS spread
Bond spread
 
 
A smaller but still relevant problem is that DataStream does not provide information from 
where it has received the prices of the CDSs and bond. This makes for a problem, but as 
Thomson DataStream is a well-known world-wide provider of financial data, often used for 
research purposes, there seems to be little reason to doubt the reliability of the data quality, 
but the validity is still difficult to judge. 
 
The choice of time-period to investigate was largely decided by at what point the credit crunch 
is deemed to have started and how much information was available in total. The results show 
that both during and in the period before the crisis, there seems to be less of a connection 
between the CDS and bond spread than during the whole span of the dataset. A more proper 
way of choosing the time periods to investigate would have been valuable, but since there are 
no clear theoretical grounds to base the choice on, it would still be arbitrary. Of course the 
market will react to the perceived increase in risk during the crisis, but when does the market 
start to react? There may be other factors than the spreads themselves that might show that 
this is happening. 
 
Even if the choice of method for investigating the collected material is quite textbook, there is 
still a problem with the choice of lags during several of the tests. When an information 
criterion was not possible to use in the software, manual methods were resorted to. Without 
theoretical guidance, shorter (0–20 days) lags were found appropriate testing considering the 
nature of the studied objects and the size of the periods implying no trades. More than 10 lags 
were never found to be the significant choice and were only resorted to for information 
purposes and thus no results are based on a lag number greater than 10. 
 
Also, the Granger causality test does not, as implied by the name, exactly tell what causality 
may exist between the bonds and CDSs. What it actually does tell is how and if the two 
instruments move together over time. 
 
Another quite puzzling find during the testing is that the ADF test on residuals and the 
Johansen testing procedure often give contrary results concerning the cointegrating 
relationships investigated. Brooks voices critique against the Engle-Granger procedure72 
although not specifically touching on why the tests in this thesis may have given such 
                                                     
72 Brooks, Chris, Introductory Econometrics for Finance, Cambridge University Press 2008, p 342-343 
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contradictory results. Brooks conclusion seems to be that the Johansen method is preferable in 
any case73. Also Zhu takes both methods results as proof of cointegration without much further 
elaboration74 on whether one method gives more robust results than the other. In this thesis 
this mindset has been adopted, although contrasting results are commented on when found. 
All Johansen trace tests needs H0:r=0 to be rejected and H0:r=1 to not be rejected to prove 
cointegration. 
 
Analysis 
The section provides an analysis of the test results. Explanations of the difference between the 
CDS spread and the Bond spread will be suggested. Also the cointegrating relationship and 
different factors influencing the market will be discussed. 
 
As seen in the presentation of data, the difference between the CDS spread and bond spread 
for the same reference entity is not zero in any case as the pricing model suggests. Does this 
mean that there are arbitrage possibilities present? Not necessarily.  
 
The credit spread depends on both the bond spread and the CDS spread, and to explain the 
arbitrage relationship, both spreads must be taken into consideration. As described above, 
there are several factors that the arbitrage model does not account for. One example is taxes. 
The companies in this investigation have different tax domiciles, and thereby follow different 
taxation rules. As an example, yields from treasury notes are deductible from state income tax 
in the US. Maybe this can be one explanation behind our finding that the bond spread is 
averagely higher than the CDS spread in our investigated data, at least as regards the US 
companies (that accounts for over 50% of the companies in the sample)? 
 
Furthermore, the theoretical arbitrage relationship holds for floating-rate instruments.75As 
floating rate instruments are not very wide spread, the empirical studies generally use fixed-
coupon bonds76, which also is the bond type used in this investigation. In case of default, the 
protection seller is obliged to pay the face value of the bond, and will in this case probably 
demand a higher CDS premium as compensation for a CDS on a bond quoted below par, which 
will cause the credit spread to increase.77 
 
The size of the bond spread is obviously also affected by the choice of rate to use as a proxy for 
the risk free rate. As discussed earlier, the swap rate has in previous studies showed to be the 
best proxy for the risk free rate, but none of the investigations referred to cover a time period 
from after 2005. It could not be excluded that another rate might be a better proxy. The size of 
the bond spread is also dependent on the construction method of the synthetic bonds, which 
have sometimes given rise to seemingly implausible proxies for the 5-year spread.  
 
Another factor that is unrelated to the underlying credit risk, but still most likely has influence 
on the prices of the two spreads, is the liquidity in the market. According to Dötz, the liquidity 
                                                     
73 ibid 
74 Zhu, Haibin, ”An Empirical Comparison of Credit Spreads between the Bond Market and the Credit Default Swap Market”, 
Journal of Financial Services Research, 2006:3, p. 228 
75 Duffie, Darrel, “Credit Swap Valuation”, Financial Analysts Journal, 1999:1, p. 74  
76 Dötz, Niko, “Time-varying contributions by the corporate bond and CDS markets to credit risk price discovery”, Discussion 
Paper: series, p. 7 
77 ibid 
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in the CDS market can temporarily dry out, particularly in times of financial distress, since “the 
market players, whose herding behaviour, particularly in times of crisis, can strain liquidity, 
amplify market volatility and hamper price discovery”.78 Another reason could be that 
protection sellers no longer are willing to sell protection, when the credit quality of the 
underlying companies weakens. Zhu finds that a liquid CDS market (measured as the bid-ask 
spread) implies a lower bid-ask spread.79 The last time period of our investigation is influenced 
by financial turmoil, and this period has also been characterised by low liquidity in the CDS 
market. This is probably one important explanation behind the finding that the average credit 
spread is substantially higher in period 3, than in the two earlier periods. We also found that 
the first period had a higher average credit spread than the second. One possible explanation 
could be that also some months in the beginning of 2005 was characterised by some 
turbulence, according to Dötz.80 
 
Our findings imply a somewhat higher credit spread than most previous studies do. One 
explanation to this could be the above-mentioned suggestion that the spread increases in 
financial distress which the last app. 16 months of the period investigated is characterised by, 
and our investigation can thereby be said to support this argument. As shown in the section of 
the data description, both the average CDS spreads and average bond spreads, and as well as 
the difference between them, were significantly higher during the third period, characterised 
by turbulence. This is a sign of the relationship between the credit risk (which is assumed to be 
higher in the third period) and the CDS as well as the bond spread. Also the credit spread, as 
well as the standard deviation of the credit spread, was much higher during the third period. 
 
As argued previously, the lack of regulation of the CDS market makes the exposure of the 
market player invisible. This could lead to information bias, and an ineffective market. Since 
the market players don’t know how large amount of protection, and for which underlying 
entities protection is sold, it is difficult to assess the counterparty’s risk properly. This might 
also affect the pricing of credit risk, albeit the effect is probably very difficult to investigate. If 
the ongoing debate will lead to a stricter regulation in the CDS market, this might increase 
transparency in the future. 
 
One thing to bear in mind is that the CDS market is relatively new, and far from mature. It has 
existed for a little more than a decade, with only a small traded amount in the start, and with a 
rapid, almost exponential increase of the amount outstanding. This could be compared with 
the bond market that has existed for a few hundred years.81 It has been argued that when the 
trade in futures started in the 1980’s, there was a similar development, with unexpected price 
movements. However, as the market for futures matured, it also stabilised. It is not unlikely 
that a similar development will be seen in the CDS market. 
 
                                                     
78 ibid, p. 24 
79 Zhu, Haibin, ”An Empirical Comparison of Credit Spreads between the Bond Market and the Credit Default Swap Market”, 
Journal of Financial Services Research, 2006:3, p. 211-235. 
80 Dötz, Niko, “Time-varying contributions by the corporate bond and CDS markets to credit risk price discovery”, Discussion 
Paper: series 2: Banking and Financial Studies, no 08/2007, published by Deutsche Bundesbank, p. 22   
81 The start year is very difficult to set, since it depends on how to definition of key concepts, as “bond”, “market” and so on. But as 
an example, trading in government bonds began on the Frankfurt Stock Exchange, already in the end of the 17th century. 
“Historie: Bürger, Fürsten, Neue Börsen - 18. und 19. Jahrhundert“ published by  Deutsche Börse Group. http://deutsche-
boerse.com/dbag/dispatch/de/kir/gdb_navigation/career/ 
10_The_Company/10_Deutsche_Boerse_Group/90_History?horizontal=page3 
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It can be concluded that there are a number of factors affecting the spreads, which not make it 
unlikely that the arbitrage relationship holds, even though the credit spread found is not zero. 
One thing that indicates that such a relationship still holds is that the test results indicate a 
cointegrating relationship. This relationship does not hold for each entity, for each point of 
time, but our tests still give support to the view that such a relationship exist in many cases.  
 
For a theoretical arbitrage relationship to exist there has to be proven that the CDS and generic 
bond of the chosen entities do cointegrate during the periods investigated. 
During the complete period, 2004-01-01 to 2008-11-24 there is a mixed impression of whether 
the instruments’ spreads are connected or not, 19 of 29 entities are shown to have cointegrated 
CDS and bond spreads judging by the Engle-Granger ADF test. The Johansen test tells us the 
same number, but not for exactly the same entities. Two spread-pairs are said to not 
cointegrate by both tests and 11 are said to do. As will be shown, the circumstances influencing 
or influenced by the credit crisis may account for part of the lack of cointegration between 
some CDS and bonds. Still, more companies than expected are indicated to have non-
cointegrated CDS and bond spreads judging by the results from the two tests. 
 
In the first separate period of the study, few of the entities can be proven to be connected in 
the way suggested by theory. Seven companies show a cointegrating relationship in the Engle-
Granger ADF test, even though the assumption was that this period should have the highest 
number of cointegrating spreads. The Johansen test gives quite the opposite answer: 25 entities 
show signs of a cointegrating vector. The Johansen test and the Engle-Granger ADF test gives 
the same result only in two cases as for when there is no cointegration and in 5 cases when 
there is. In the articles referenced, unfortunately no clear answer as to why this situation 
appears to be found. Worth noting is also that even though the Engle-Granger ADF test and 
Johansen tests for period 1 show less cointegrating entities, than for the total period, Granger 
causality is found for most of the companies, a trend noticeable for all the sub periods. 
 
When plotting the CDS and bond series of the different companies, there is no doubt that 
prices has increased in the last year, which the average price confirm, thus concluding that 
even though spreads may not always cointegrate, both CDS and bond spread may be used as a 
measure of credit risk, although equilibrium between them in some instances do not exist. 
 
In the second period, which is closest to the start of the credit crunch, the situation has 
changed.  Only one company can be said to cointegrate by the Engle-Granger ADF (and 
Johansen agrees on this one) test, although Johansen implies there might be 20 cases where 
the theoretic relationship studied is present. The standard deviation of the CDS spread has also 
increased threefold. In a study by Zhu82 the CDSs have been found to be the primary 
instrument of price discovery when pricing credit risk and thus could possibly anticipate the 
great rise in spread in the following and last observed period (period 3). A more in-debt study 
would be able to tell if there is a significant connection. Granger-causality seems to be just 
about the same as in period one although somewhat less connections are expected. 
 
During period three oddly enough, there are signs of more companies with cointegrated 
spreads than during the pre-crisis second period. Six entities are showed by Engle-Granger 
ADF and 19 by Johansen to be cointegrated. The two tests agree on four entities being 
cointegrated, and eight entities not being cointegrated. One reason might be that some 
companies listed may have received state support and thus a better credit rating, which could 
                                                     
82 Zhu, Haibin, ”An Empirical Comparison of Credit Spreads between the Bond Market and the Credit Default Swap Market”, 
Journal of Financial Services Research, 2006:3, p. 231 
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possibly stabilize the markets for CDS and bonds. Government takeovers or similar changes in 
the company’s equity and debt structure as a result of the crisis may also contribute as 
stabilizing factors. A separate study of the impact of government intervention or similar would 
be able to provide more solid evidence.  
 
The variance in the number of cointegrating companies during the three periods makes it hard 
to infer what changes over time. One thing that seems clear though is that there is less obvious 
cointegration in the separate sub periods (especially in the sub period during the crisis), than 
during the whole period. Without a test that clearly holds higher power, there is not very 
much that can be said of the cointegration test results, than that they in every case show less 
cointegration than proposed by the arbitrage relationship. 
 
As a consequence of the higher risk perceived during different periods, fewer trades might be 
made and thus causing a discrepancy in the pricing of the bonds and their derivatives, which 
in turn leads to less of a cointegrating relationship. The information on what risk-exposure 
each entity has, might be seen as quite asymmetric and may thus lead to a less-than-perfect 
pricing situation. This may still hold but apparently is not as prominent during the crisis as in 
the time before, in contrast to what might seem likely. 
 
In all, the results in the short run were not those anticipated with regards to general economic 
theory, although it is hard to tell if this might be a result of misspecifications in the study or 
economic reality. As discussed in the section on reliability, the generic bonds may have caused 
some erroneous results and there may also be the risk of misspecifications in the lags of the 
tests. More tests for cointegration might also be applied to generate more robust results. 
 
In the long run, there seems to be somewhat better evidence of cointegration between the CDS 
and bond market as have been expected, although an unexpected number of entities still does 
not seem to cointegrate. 
 
Conclusion 
The average CDS spread, as well as the average bond spread, is drastically higher in the third 
period. The same is true for the credit spread and the standard deviation of the credit spread. 
When looking at which spread is the highest, CDS or bond, there is no strong dominance.  
 
We also find that the relationship s = y – r does not hold. The differences between the bond 
spread and CDS spread can at times be quite large and it is difficult to explain if these findings 
are due to that arbitrage possibilities actually exist (which is unlikely, considering the use of 
averages), or if other factors lie behind.  
 
The existence of a theoretical arbitrage relationship is further tested for, using cointegration 
tests. The Johansen test is more likely to indicate cointegration for all sub-periods and has 
given the same result as the Engle-Granger ADF when testing the total period. The almost 
contradictive relationship between the two tests makes it hard to infer any conclusions from 
the cointegration study. It might be that the tests are sensitive to the size of the sample and 
thus gives different (but not necessarily correct) results when testing the total period. In any 
case there is less strong evidence of cointegration than expected and thus the arbitrage 
relationship cannot be proven to be found in many of the entities studied, although the scope 
of the lack of connection needs to be more thoroughly tested. 
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Further research 
Although there already has been research done in this field, there are a wide number of 
question still unanswered. It would be interesting to quantify how large influence different 
factors have on the CDS spread?  
 
One thing that this investigation does not examine is the liquidity issue: how does liquidity in 
the different markets affect the spreads? How is the traded amount influenced by the risk and 
price level of the instruments? 
 
It would be also be fitting to dig even deeper into the relations between the different financial 
instruments studied. Constructing VAR och VECM models of each relation, imposing 
restrictions and performing different tests to estimate sensitivities in the variables would yield 
even more information. 
 
Another thing, that this investigation does not at all cover, is the behaviour of a CDS spread 
before a credit event, i.e. how well the CDS spreads have been able to anticipate credit events.  
 
The CDS as an instrument is still quite new, and the market far from mature. This will 
probably give rise both to changes in the market conditions, and hopefully, a wide range of 
future research within the field. 
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Appendix  
 
Average prices CDS spreads and Bond spreads for each entity, for each period 
 
TOTAL period Period 1 Period 2 Period 3
2004-01-01 to 2008-11-24 2005-01-05 to 2006-04-21 2006-04-22 to 2007-08-08 2007-08-08 to 2008-11-24
NAME
Average 
CDS 
spread
Average 
Bond 
spread*
∆, Bond 
spread – 
CDS 
spread
Average 
CDS 
spread
Average 
Bond 
spread*
∆, Bond 
spread – 
CDS 
spread
Average 
CDS 
spread
Average 
Bond 
spread*
∆, Bond 
spread – 
CDS 
spread
Average 
CDS 
spread
Average 
Bond 
spread*
∆, Bond 
spread – 
CDS 
spread
Allstate 37,50 48,78 11,28 23,13 18,20 -4,93 16,24 15,56 -0,69 83,05 144,26 61,21
Amro 27,00 120,47 93,47 9,66 20,17 10,51 7,51 -42,56 -50,07 74,56 458,42 383,86
AvalonBay 76,44 88,25 11,80 30,54 33,00 2,46 28,57 27,48 -1,09 202,50 236,09 33,59
Banca Paschi 29,54 94,26 64,72 17,46 130,55 113,09 10,51 120,18 109,67 67,37 65,86 -1,51
Banco Santander 27,54 21,15 -6,39 10,64 -25,14 -35,78 10,74 -6,39 -17,13 71,07 -10,43 -81,50
Bank of America 35,44 -10,29 -45,74 16,36 6,29 -10,07 12,04 -196,86 -208,90 88,36 128,12 39,76
Barclays 30,61 52,14 21,53 9,77 32,68 22,90 8,31 -1,82 -10,13 89,20 74,67 -14,53
Bear Stearns 63,49 133,12 69,63 28,38 66,42 38,03 31,49 90,04 58,55 152,62 278,28 125,66
BNP Paribas 20,18 45,13 24,95 9,18 28,21 19,03 7,06 15,55 8,49 51,21 99,23 48,02
Citigroup 45,23 60,83 15,60 16,14 13,11 -3,03 11,57 13,50 1,93 126,43 192,50 66,07
Commerzbank 32,34 19,81 -12,52 17,93 8,03 -9,90 11,86 -10,70 -22,57 73,50 -6,84 -80,34
Credit Agricole 25,20 43,29 18,09 9,31 13,16 3,86 7,47 14,77 7,31 69,68 116,25 46,57
Deutsche Bank 31,10 26,05 -5,05 15,65 6,43 -9,22 12,68 16,41 3,73 75,98 66,87 -9,11
Developers 137,14 127,41 -9,74 52,60 58,61 6,01 43,41 40,86 -2,55 374,38 326,48 -47,90
Fannie Mae 22,69 222,91 200,22 14,92 270,47 255,55 9,18 137,67 128,49 44,25 151,14 106,90
Fortis NL 42,96 48,19 5,23 20,12 57,44 37,32 8,58 1,49 -7,09 112,40 90,92 -21,48
Freddie Mac 21,79 532,11 510,33 11,93 464,31 452,38 8,04 485,37 477,33 45,26 714,98 669,72
Goldman Sachs 58,72 -92,36 -151,08 26,07 -115,72 -141,79 27,62 -258,23 -285,86 142,31 66,80 -75,52
Investor 39,69 44,61 4,92 21,78 20,45 -1,33 12,20 15,03 2,84 89,48 100,61 11,13
Kimco 86,87 82,95 -3,92 29,58 31,91 2,33 27,21 28,58 1,37 246,99 230,58 -16,42
Lincoln 66,54 58,17 -8,36 24,47 13,38 -11,08 17,43 24,89 7,46 187,83 151,97 -35,86
Marsh&McLennan 58,84 91,51 32,67 57,24 68,06 10,82 52,35 64,72 12,37 69,64 174,28 104,64
Merril Lynch 71,24 92,24 21,00 25,68 24,04 -1,64 25,94 53,08 27,14 192,39 251,79 59,40
Morgan Stanley 78,01 98,03 20,01 26,50 31,73 5,23 28,04 31,73 3,69 215,11 274,75 59,63
Simon Property 70,44 88,27 17,83 39,22 42,36 3,14 22,72 27,96 5,24 167,75 218,73 50,98
SLM Corp. 169,95 172,00 2,05 25,92 20,96 -4,96 70,58 66,95 -3,63 517,84 541,74 23,90
Societe Generale 25,27 117,50 92,23 10,31 208,34 198,03 7,54 34,40 26,86 68,33 172,21 103,88
Wachovia 56,59 75,62 19,04 15,22 12,49 -2,73 13,48 14,23 0,75 168,59 235,52 66,93
Wells Fargo 33,44 35,87 2,43 14,29 6,90 -7,38 10,49 8,05 -2,44 84,81 110,24 25,43
52,48 87,52 35,04 21,72 54,03 32,30 19,34 28,69 9,35 136,31 195,03 58,73  
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Standard deviations for the data for each entity, for each period 
 
TOTAL period Period 1 Period 2 Period 3
2004-01-01 to 2008-11-24 2005-01-05 to 2006-04-21 2006-04-22 to 2007-08-08 2007-08-08 to 2008-11-24
Average 
CDS 
spread
Average 
Bond 
spread*
∆, Bond 
spread – 
CDS 
spread
Average 
CDS 
spread
Average 
Bond 
spread*
∆, Bond 
spread – 
CDS 
spread
Average 
CDS 
spread
Average 
Bond 
spread*
∆, Bond 
spread – 
CDS 
spread
Average 
CDS 
spread
Average 
Bond 
spread*
∆, Bond 
spread – 
CDS 
spread
Allstate 45,28 71,72 36,29 3,81 4,66 6,34 6,61 4,83 8,10 69,64 83,66 36,19
Amro 33,36 255,28 230,99 1,84 14,16 14,86 4,48 215,02 215,16 33,33 207,30 197,20
AvalonBay 99,25 125,92 45,54 3,89 7,46 7,38 7,97 4,76 9,29 125,29 173,69 83,10
Banca Paschi 26,26 44,78 60,29 2,64 32,79 33,52 5,38 40,79 40,90 24,10 23,88 34,42
Banco Santander 30,16 110,51 116,51 1,69 138,65 138,15 4,45 13,83 16,22 29,07 37,80 28,73
Bank of America 38,21 140,13 116,03 2,87 42,68 41,17 6,09 89,72 85,74 40,52 95,49 67,50
Barclays 42,37 64,15 63,80 1,79 64,49 63,80 4,65 18,68 20,70 46,14 61,35 53,38
Bear Stearns 71,62 105,36 76,21 4,79 24,85 22,49 19,36 40,34 33,03 90,82 103,65 124,36
BNP Paribas 21,37 44,40 30,46 1,78 7,19 6,51 3,39 9,84 9,05 20,07 55,70 49,65
Citigroup 62,08 103,08 46,61 2,87 4,12 4,06 6,51 5,97 4,90 74,69 129,33 68,30
Commerzbank 28,80 78,63 85,76 3,59 91,73 91,73 7,77 29,32 29,24 26,18 34,91 37,12
Credit Agricole 31,19 54,51 34,32 1,70 10,27 9,42 3,32 7,69 7,11 31,21 61,46 56,31
Deutsche Bank 31,91 26,42 16,73 2,55 9,39 9,91 5,57 4,15 5,44 32,94 14,04 28,03
Developers 238,88 169,99 100,95 8,14 8,06 8,46 6,25 5,52 8,07 372,93 234,75 189,05
Fannie Mae 16,26 113,76 115,38 4,61 103,54 99,27 4,60 25,92 25,47 15,62 67,56 66,27
Fortis NL 62,88 52,30 39,43 4,13 37,71 34,36 3,45 15,84 16,26 90,74 65,89 47,11
Freddie Mac 17,27 124,48 112,06 3,34 12,79 14,44 4,65 32,14 31,00 15,76 94,07 87,69
Goldman Sachs 72,75 183,91 139,70 4,71 61,29 62,35 11,54 161,63 159,74 101,96 207,86 130,29
Investor 48,38 58,49 20,26 2,32 3,07 2,55 2,55 3,69 4,52 72,29 90,93 37,82
Kimco 140,21 129,35 37,39 4,05 4,49 6,79 7,49 5,13 9,11 199,10 183,82 69,60
Lincoln 140,18 76,19 77,39 2,53 5,12 5,54 6,28 9,20 13,40 233,05 98,21 145,11
Marsh&McLennan 26,99 70,60 59,89 16,72 19,13 10,16 13,44 11,57 10,66 22,19 81,69 77,64
Merril Lynch 86,77 116,87 51,00 4,66 5,43 4,58 12,81 41,37 32,82 91,98 122,81 77,86
Morgan Stanley 134,59 183,73 75,48 4,34 4,70 7,42 11,72 10,47 12,76 207,22 291,97 138,26
Simon Property 88,95 112,77 36,49 1,84 14,16 14,86 8,64 6,76 9,25 129,14 156,81 57,48
SLM Corp. 274,91 271,87 65,53 3,28 7,60 8,81 86,90 73,34 17,49 337,50 297,47 122,85
Societe Generale 30,50 131,75 126,48 1,97 168,95 170,07 3,23 39,39 39,33 31,45 111,65 104,32
Wachovia 97,42 150,77 78,17 2,60 3,67 4,52 6,00 6,51 6,25 137,38 226,19 140,70
Wells Fargo 36,81 59,31 33,58 2,22 6,72 6,80 5,27 4,65 6,90 38,28 75,65 58,31
AVERAGE 71,57 111,42 73,41 3,70 31,69 31,39 9,67 32,35 30,62 94,50 120,33 83,26  
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 Number of days where bond spread >CDS spread 
 
Name Total period Period 1 Period 2 Period 3
Allstate 626 48,98% 91 26,92% 190 56,21% 331 97,93%
Amro 1053 82,39% 297 87,87% 184 54,44% 334 98,82%
AvalonBay 866 67,76% 200 59,17% 207 61,24% 212 62,72%
Banca Paschi 1090 85,29% 338 100,00% 338 100,00% 160 47,34%
Banco Santander 626 48,98% 121 35,80% 190 56,21% 331 97,93%
Bank of America 699 54,69% 213 63,02% 0 0,00% 274 81,07%
Barclays 773 60,49% 226 66,86% 191 56,51% 92 27,22%
Bear Stearns 1195 93,51% 317 93,79% 329 97,34% 293 86,69%
BNP Paribas 1168 91,39% 334 98,82% 274 81,07% 296 87,57%
Citigroup 630 49,30% 71 21,01% 234 69,23% 300 88,76%
Commerzbank 529 41,39% 221 65,38% 37 10,95% 18 5,33%
Credit Agricole 1088 85,13% 263 77,81% 278 82,25% 283 83,73%
Deutsche Bank 498 38,97% 61 18,05% 280 82,84% 155 45,86%
Developers 717 56,10% 262 77,51% 124 36,69% 136 40,24%
Fannie Mae 1268 99,22% 338 100,00% 338 100,00% 328 97,04%
Fortis NL 707 55,32% 287 84,91% 116 34,32% 104 30,77%
Freddie Mac 1278 100,00% 338 100,00% 338 100,00% 338 100,00%
Goldman Sachs 100 7,82% 5 1,48% 14 4,14% 81 23,96%
Investor 812 63,54% 101 29,88% 240 71,01% 207 61,24%
Kimco 673 52,66% 203 60,06% 223 65,98% 138 40,83%
Lincoln 723 56,57% 14 4,14% 265 78,40% 212 62,72%
Marsh&McLennan 1021 79,89% 315 93,20% 305 90,24% 336 99,41%
Merril Lynch 713 55,79% 107 31,66% 263 77,81% 291 86,09%
Morgan Stanley 942 73,71% 239 70,71% 210 62,13% 257 76,04%
Simon Property 993 77,70% 236 69,82% 273 80,77% 275 81,36%
SLM Corp. 555 43,43% 74 21,89% 179 52,96% 246 72,78%
Societe Generale 1237 96,79% 338 100,00% 326 96,45% 309 91,42%
Wachovia 762 59,62% 96 28,40% 185 54,73% 252 74,56%
Wells Fargo 431 33,72% 26 7,69% 147 43,49% 236 69,82%
AVERAGE 820 64% 198 59% 216 64% 235 70%
2004-01-01 to 2008-
11-24
2007-08-08 to 2008-
11-24
2005-01-05 to 2006-
04-21 
2006-04-22 to 2007-
08-08
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Test statistics for the complete period, 2004-01-01 to 2008-11-24 
Company Unit root and stationarity tests   Cointegration tests 
  
ADF Test H0:I(1) KPSS 
Test H0:I(0) 
   
H0:No 
cointegrating 
equation 
H0: r=1 
cointegrating 
vector exists 
  CDS Spreads Bond Yields   Engle/Granger Johansen 
  ADF KPSS ADF KPSS ADF Trace Stat 
Allstate Corp 2.51445 6.10749 4.28346 10.794 -4.31842  14.04399 
Amro Bank -1.94224 10.5424 -0.923968 6.58323 -3.2276  0.211969 
Avalon Bay 3.177 9.59306 5.22265 8.27788 -4.61771  19.97770 
Banca Paschi -1.70826 4.21431 -1.379 4.21431 -1.69258  2.395344 
Banco 
Santander -1.63918 11.2447 -1.75402 5.19767 -1.64464  3.219033 
Bank of America 0.220864 10.4593 1.42142 3.9552  -1.88636  1.036899 
Barclays -1.77916 11.0218 -0.179674 4.79985 -2.68331  0.003448 
Bear Sterns  -4.13998 7.99017 -0.42855 11.7001 -5.90281  1.700480 
BNP Paribas -1.57048 10.8128 -2.13919 6.87829 -5.22049  1.687035 
Citigroup -0.826945 10.0288 1.10932 10.2412 -6.48285  0.017730 
Commerzbank -2.42439 9.29331 -3.40967 5.73341 -2.44509  5.632254 
Credit Agricole -1.52199 11.0355 1.36672 9.885 -2.87568  0.012850 
Deutsche Bank -1.83305 10.8328 -1.00727 14.6428 -5.12411  0.539458 
Developers 
Dvrsf 9.52973 6.41258 6.57964 8.22024 -5.92106  38.17143 
Fannie Mae -2.31096 6.85323  -0.340243 13.8627  -2.3212  0.157056 
Fortis NL 0.574748 4.17919 -1.32534 1.81819 -0.306916  0.887945 
Freddie Mac -2.09341 7.57056 -1.62851 14.2033 -3.93849  1.285915 
Goldman Sachs -0.95606 8.37809 -1.12781 3.38871 -3.40314  0.686447 
Investor 0.265039 5.84519 0.305075 5.10185 -6.28677  1.654881 
Kimco 5.92526 8.20323 4.55621 8.44415 -4.78493  20.82038 
Lincoln 2.71664 5.24984 5.3365 9.40954 -2.93625  8.444370 
Marsh 
McLennan -4.27927 1.26791  1.32278 9.3127 -3.94917  1.868867 
Merril Lynch -1.44054 11.3785 2.49093 13.353 -4.69704  0.799274 
Morgan Stanley -2.42109 6.97977 0.190096 6.31514 -6.57728  5.031263 
Simon Property  4.33887 6.67073 9.75935 7.44565 -7.07322  55.62257 
SLM Corp -1.17943 10.7398 -0.53155 12.0488 -6.76732  1.784499 
Societe General -0.901148 10.846 -1.55127 1.81932 -0.953205  2.037201 
Wachovia Corp -3.04223 8.541 -1.46251 7.6725 -3.467345  13.39102 
Wells Fargo -0.976411 10.3345 4.80425 9.47562 -4.02921  4.917691 
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Test statistics for period 1, 2005-01-05 to 2006-04-21 
Company Unit root and stationarity tests   Cointegration tests 
  
ADF Test H0:I(1) KPSS 
Test H0:I(0) 
   
H0:No 
cointegrating 
equation 
H0: r=1 
cointegrating 
vector exists 
  CDS Spreads Bond Yields   Engle/Granger Johansen 
  ADF KPSS ADF KPSS ADF Trace Stat 
Allstate Corp -1,82705 1,60101 -2,8896 1,04409 -1,97218  14.04399 
Amro Bank -1,74388 3,05068 2,96055 2,17766 -1,98338  0.211969 
Avalon Bay -2,12849 7,29374 -2,10413 3,21155 -2,56981  19.97770 
Banca Paschi -0,62518 2,48307 1,18677 5,0031 -1,54881  2.395344 
Banco 
Santander -1,99009 1,79459 -1,91127 3,13143 -2,14252  3.219033 
Bank of America -1,90597 3,05423 1,3287 10,6857 -2,682  1.036899 
Barclays -2,01985 2,18483 -1,48466 11,0787 -2,30349  0.003448 
Bear Sterns -2,17073 6,41488 -1,69047 3,92173 -3,20477  1.700480 
BNP Paribas -1,69234 5,31708 -3,45025 3,96578 -2,89456  1.687035 
Citigroup -1,89827 2,98683 -3,5682 0,713935 -2,17659  0.017730 
Commerzbank -1,37102 2,41775 -2,57325 1,36904 -1,35725  5.632254 
Credit Agricole -1,33462 3,82476 -1,48303 4,07654 -2,07062  0.012850 
Deutsche Bank -2,55403 3,23325 -1,52868 12,4931 -2,28395  0.539458 
Developers 
Dvrsf -3,01385 2,05458 -2,11408 0,75968 -3,45917  38.17143 
Fannie Mae -0,878306 5,27068 -0,747297 5,63097 -2,61934  0.157056 
Fortis NL -0,972992 4,16331 -1,26839 4,02708 -3,25709  0.887945 
Freddie Mac -1,21475 10,1639 -1,68586 3,42049 -1,62672  1.285915 
Goldman Sachs -0,95606 2,44722 -1,12781 1,30863 -3,40314  0.686447 
Investor -2,73075 1,22542 -2,64171 1,73022 -3,58627  1.654881 
Kimco -2,20008 2,27688 -2,38321 0,899545 -2,46273  20.82038 
Lincoln -2,88806 3,39232 -3,50518 2,37817 -2,92199  8.444370 
Marsh 
McLennan -2,53289 4,18313 -2,27059 9,12999 -3,51759  1.868867 
Merril Lynch -2,07143 7,64054 -2,78426 2,52714 -3,26102  0.799274 
Morgan Stanley -1,6599 6,82093 -2,76604 1,81854 -2,44422  5.031263 
Simon Property -1,17805 2,53382 -3,16307 2,31579 -1,98448  55.62257 
SLM Corp -1,36097 2,54267 -2,08245 3,81942 -1,69264  1.784499 
Societe General -1,07827 3,25856 -1,27374 4,38638 -1,32502  2.037201 
Wachovia Corp -2,14615 7,60826 -5,90254 0,829033 -2,16162  13.39102 
Wells Fargo -1,73374 4,0404 -2,84882 1,25171 -1,81761  4.917691 
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Test statistics for period 2, 2006-04-22 to 2007-08-08 
Company Unit root and stationarity tests   Cointegration tests 
  
ADF Test H0:I(1) KPSS 
Test H0:I(0) 
   
H0:No 
cointegrating 
equation 
H0: r=1 
cointegrating 
vector exists 
  CDS Spreads Bond Yields   Engle/Granger Johansen 
  ADF KPSS ADF KPSS ADF Trace Stat 
Allstate Corp -0.515458 1.16526 -2.15193 0.743451 -0.518171  14.04399 
Amro Bank 1.94019 0.600828 -1.58922 2.18466 -0.853821  0.211969 
Avalon Bay 1.65744 2.00376 -3.4316 2.25825 1.22839  19.97770 
Banca Paschi -0.602403 0.49332  0.438894 3.1318 -0.642815  2.395344 
Banco 
Santander -0.771154 0.323882 1.54581 3.02551 -2.40354  3.219033 
Bank of America -0.0664353 5.80532 0.962621 5.34302 -2.72626  1.036899 
Barclays 0.34168 0.537362 -0.863898 2.33358 -1.94404  0.003448 
Bear Sterns 3.44817 1.32788 -0.726992 0.898034 -0.157675  1.700480 
BNP Paribas 1.82025 0.456133 -1.69831 0.571646 -1.32996  1.687035 
Citigroup 2.36959 0.890758 0.460782 3.92254 -0.592118  0.017730 
Commerzbank -0.0975663 0.293659 -0.0160766 2.11174 1.18237  5.632254 
Credit Agricole 0.170294 0.625407 -1.03798 0.607918 0.0935481  0.012850 
Deutsche Bank 0.838298 0.608595 -1.93315 0.618847 0.453925  0.539458 
Developers 
Dvrsf 3.07608 1.41742 -2.85827 2.74382 2.57996  38.17143 
Fannie Mae  -0.979329 0.95293  -1.55105 1.53814 -0.810178  0.157056 
Fortis NL 0.0375433 0.699823 -2.72792 0.898406  0.344102  0.887945 
Freddie Mac  -2.40084 0.948977 -1.79875 2.83692 -2.65855  1.285915 
Goldman Sachs 1.74038 1.10635 -2.22413 0.451012 0.34843  0.686447 
Investor -1.91647 1.38877 -1.94013 3.82275 -1.11225  1.654881 
Kimco 0.523705 1.30581 -2.18317 1.2314 0.130403  20.82038 
Lincoln -0.947865 1.62247 -2.16388 1.47508 -1.1239  8.444370 
Marsh 
McLennan -1.65657 4.19899 -0.6156 0.922454 -2.4892  1.868867 
Merril Lynch 1.4665 1.25564 1.61989 2.53058 -0.985102  0.799274 
Morgan Stanley 2.22542 1.45481 -0.912535 1.24269 1.02333  5.031263 
Simon Property -0.271136 0.409879 -1.61473 2.36232 -1.00773  55.62257 
SLM Corp 1.4575 2.48316 0.298234 3.15986 -4.17625  1.784499 
Societe General -1.16002 0.636405 -5.68107 1.71956 -1.45139  2.037201 
Wachovia Corp 3.41652 0.800883 -0.966904 0.956572 -0.687258  13.39102 
Wells Fargo 1.6972 0.704594  -2.30772 1.19994 1.1535  4.917691 
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Test statistics for period 3, 2007-08-09 to 2008-11-24 
Company Unit root and stationarity tests   Cointegration tests 
  
ADF Test H0:I(1) KPSS 
Test H0:I(0) 
   
H0:No 
cointegrating 
equation 
H0: r=1 
cointegrating 
vector exists 
  CDS Spreads Bond Yields   Engle/Granger Johansen 
  ADF KPSS ADF KPSS ADF Trace Stat 
Allstate Corp 0.352002 1.85906 1.30828 3.06119 -4.54313  14.04399 
Amro Bank -2.27503 1.74794 -2.10582 0.715558 -2.20435  0.211969 
Avalon Bay 0.893398 1.56375 2.29899 2.17475 -2.52625  19.97770 
Banca Paschi -2.24471 1.61997 0.784582 0.544214 -2.14272  2.395344 
Banco Santander -2.09746 2.49046  0.0424825 3.564367  -2.66109  3.219033 
Bank of America -1.00445 2.74676 0.413926 2.35007 -2.91623  1.036899 
Barclays -1.89733 2.10742 0.728115 2.42154 -2.76744  0.003448 
Bear Sterns -2.90892 0.5313 -1.44624 1.92211 -2.42439  1.700480 
BNP Paribas -2.63534 1.26922 -2.21447 1.27402 -2.8749  1.687035 
Citigroup -1.62343 3.89385 -0.298397 3.65063 -3.42896  0.017730 
Commerzbank  -2.56647 0.90536 0.482354 4.09612 -2.56679  5.632254 
Credit Agricole -2.28998 1.57881 0.210632 2.79601 -2.31062  0.012850 
Deutsche Bank  -1.70061 1.85542 -2.67252 2.33838 -2.47316  0.539458 
Developers Dvrsf 5.44471 1.41573 3.12964 3.23437 -2.16726  38.17143 
Fannie Mae -2.4847 0.478321 -0.473892 2.45434 -2.60998  0.157056 
Fortis NL -0.470645 1.90588 -1.86307 4.4837 -0.728951  0.887945 
Freddie Mac -2.40084 0.649529 -1.79875 2.30846 -2.65855  1.285915 
Goldman Sachs -1.5588 1.89893 -1.03995 2.86882 -3.61515  0.686447 
Investor -0.632636 1.9579 -0.958466 2.07005 -2.29221  1.654881 
Kimco 1.23289 1.6438 1.23289 2.11118 -2.7225  20.82038 
Lincoln 1.1737 2.19481 2.52567 2.5746 -3.29831  8.444370 
Marsh McLennan -2.15506 0.522078 2.33302 2.38176 -2.27396  1.868867 
Merril Lynch -1.72974 3.46647 0.264151 4.95318 -2.23068  0.799274 
Morgan Stanley -2.39827 1.64925 -0.677263 1.89805 -4.41921  5.031263 
Simon Property 2.61172 1.79393 4.37058 2.27972  -3.59179  55.62257 
SLM Corp -2.41526 1.57967  -1.7561 1.66601 -3.37602  1.784499 
Societe General -2.14534 1.87844 -2.15896 0.378466 -1.98955  2.037201 
Wachovia Corp -2.7129 1.62582 -1.74663 3.10123 -2.71347  13.39102 
Wells Fargo -1.71965 2.45342 0.96073 2.80408 -2.43683  4.917691 
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